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iPreface
This is a master thesis in the course TPK 4900 Production and Quality Engineering, Master The-
sis. The thesis is a part of the Underwater Technology study program at the Norwegian Uni-
versity of Science and Technology (NTNU) and was carried out during the spring of 2013. The
task was made by Asbjørn Andersen at ExproSoft AS who also provided most of the information
needed to conduct this thesis. The topic was initially "Reliability Qualification of Subsea Safety
Systems" but was later changed to become more suitable.
This thesis is written for readers with knowledge regarding annular reliability and safety in
offshore gas lift applications. However, basic knowledge about these kinds of wells and equip-
ment are provided and it is thus assumed that anyone with basic knowledge in reliability theory
will understand this thesis.
Trondheim, 2013-06-10
Ole Jacob Seime
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Summary and Conclusions
This master thesis starts off by providing basic knowledge about relevant well type, well equip-
ment, gas lift and well barriers. This is basic knowledge which is needed to understand the
systems investigated throughout the rest of the thesis. Four annulus barrier configurations are
found for gas lift systems. Their maintenance strategies are briefly described and general advan-
tages and disadvantages are listed. Well barrier diagrams and well barrier schematics are also
provided for each configuration.
The terms safety instrumented system and safety instrumented function are briefly explained.
Governing regulations regarding barriers are provided both for Norway and for the United States
of America. Requirements regarding safety instrumented system and annulus well barriers in
Norway follow. These include requirements for documentation.
The safety analysis report (SAR) process is described both for non-proven and proven tech-
nology. This process and the included documentation vary for whether the components are
certified as proven in use or prior use. The required documentation is also dependent on the
system complexity. Relevant terms are discussed. Flowcharts for the various SAR processes are
made for both non-proven and proven technology based on the OLF 070 guideline. Two case
studies are used to describe the SAR process and to compare the process for non-proven versus
proven technology. Some challenges when performing SAR are found and discussed. Potential
improvements to the OLF 070 guideline and to IEC standards are also proposed.
Probability of unavailability (PFD) calculations are provided for each of the gas lift configu-
ration options based on the well barrier schematics and the well barrier diagrams. The results
are discussed and an overall assessment of these configurations is made. The result shows that
three of the options can be recommended. The option with three barrier elements has slightly
better reliability than the most used gas lift configuration which only includes two barriers. A
system weakness is reviled and an improvement proposed. The suggested improvement proves
increased system reliability which resulted in recommendation of all four configurations op-
tions. A specified configuration is recommended not to be used. However, the suggested im-
provement may not be used in practise due to blocking of monitoring. Another improvement is
suggested and analysed, but showed minor changes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter presents the master thesis with its background, objectives, limitations, approach
and structure of the report.
1.1 Background
The offshore industry is pushing technology to become more cost-effective and safe. In many
cases, the proven technology is no longer viable and new solutions need to be developed. One
of these developments is related to replacing conventional annulus safety valves (ASVs) with
fail-safe check valves in the wellhead on the annulus side.
At the same time requirements are changing. In recent years, the IEC 61508- requirements
have been taken into the offshore industry requirements in Norway. This has resulted in the
OLF 070 guideline. Appropriate evidence shall be available to document that the components
and sub-systems are suitable for use in safety-instrumented systems. The level of detail of the
evidence should be in accordance with the complexity of the considered component or sub-
system and with the probability of failure claimed to achieve the required safety integrity level
of the safety-instrumented function(s). The evidence of suitability will be different for proven-
in-use components compared with components not proven in use.
2
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Problem Formulation
Annulus safety valves are risky, expensive and time-consuming to maintain. New technology
has therefore been developed to reduce problems related to maintenance of these annulus bar-
riers. IEC, OLF and other requirements must be followed in order to qualify the new technol-
ogy as annulus barriers. The required qualification is dependent on whether the technology is
proven suitable for its use or not. A structured way of performing these steps is of importance
to the oil and gas industry and others.
Literature Survey
This thesis is based on books, web pages, articles and theses. The second chapter utilizes in-
formation found in http://www.ExproBase.com/ (ExproSoft (2013)) and standards such as
NORSOK and OLF 070 when presenting basic information about the relevant type of well, well
equipment, gas lift and barriers.
Chapter three presents the different annulus barrier configurations which are based on in-
formation found in http://www.ExproBase.com/ and technical reports provided by ExproSoft
AS.
Chapter four presents terms in reliability theory which is found in Rausand and Høyland
(2004) and is of importance in chapter five, six and seven.
Chapter five presents requirements regarding annulus safety. Governing regulations in the
United States of America are published at http://www.ecfr.gov/ while governing regulations
in Norway are published at http://www.ptil.no. Specific requirements regarding annulus
barriers are fund in NORSOK standards (see NORSOK (2012), NORSOK (2004) and NORSOK
(2002)) and in the OLF 070 guideline (see OLF (2004)). IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 have also been
used in this chapter.
Chapter six describes the safety analysis report (SAR) process for both non-proven and proven
technology based on OLF 070 and technical reports (see ConocoPhillips (2013b) and Cono-
coPhillips (2013a)) provided by ExproSoft AS.
Chapter seven utilizes theory found in Rausand and Høyland (2004) and technical reports
provided by ExproSoft AS to perform probability of failure on demand (PFD) calculations. Off-
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shore reliability data (OREDA), WellMaster, PTS and OLF 070 has been used as sources to relia-
bility data in this chapter.
Remaining Work
The PFD calculation (objective 4) needs more work. This is mainly because the result was un-
expected and the suggested improvements did not solve the problem. It is suggested to obtain
newer reliability data from different databases and to construct new fault trees to enhance the
result.
The task can also be extended to include blowout from reservoir. More components must
then be included and the analysis will be more extensive. This is a large objective which can be
included in another master thesis.
More work can be done to improve the system.
There is also remaining work regarding challenges and potential improvements to the IEC
standards and the OLF guideline. Only a few challenges related to OLF 070 and the safety anal-
ysis report (SAR) process were pointed out due to limited time and lack of experience. More
challenges can effectively be obtained if one or several more experienced person(s) are avail-
able.
There is also remaining work regarding follow-up of the proposed improvements. E.g. alter-
native methods of obtaining reliability data for new technology should be investigated further.
It is also suggested to investigate the likelihood of having a mandatory retrieval of the ASV
if it is stuck in closed position. If this happens often, the M-SAS configurations may not be
recommended.
1.2 Objectives
The overall objective of this master thesis is to describe the steps components need to go through
in order to be a part of a safety function. The focus will be on the systems covered by the OLF
070 requirements, but other guidelines/standards may be used to demonstrate the “evidence
of suitability”. The approach will be tested through a case study of a safety function used for
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protection against gas release from a gas lifted well. Two alternative configurations of the safety
function for annulus gas protection shall be assessed:
• (Safety function with hydraulic ASV)
• (Safety function with use of an M-SAS (surface annular safety) valve)
Both these components are “proven in use” according to OLF or IEC. Therefore also an alterna-
tive with an electrically operated ASV (non proven) is included as part of the SAR (safety analysis
report) task. To meet the overall objective the following objectives are treated:
1. Describe the gas lifted systems (both ASV and M-SAS configuration). Discuss pros and
cons related to each solution.
2. Provide an overview of the requirements related to the annulus safety valve system. De-
scribe the necessary documentation for both the solutions according to IEC or OLF (proven
vs. not proven technology)
3. Describe the process of fulfilling the safety analysis report (SAR) for both non-proven and
proven technology. Use a hydraulically operated ASV (proven) and an electrically operated
ASV (non-proven) as cases and point out challenges/propose improvements.
4. Perform PFD calculation for:
• The safety function with ASV
• The safety function with M-SAS
and discuss the results obtained.
5. Carry out an overall assessment of the two alternative safety function configurations (re-
liability, repair risk, etc.)
1.3 Limitations
This task is limited to offshore topside oil production wells that use gas lift through A-annulus.
This is because M-SAS valves are only relevant in these applications. The focus regarding leakage
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will be limited to lift gas release from annulus reservoir (A-annulus). Blowout from the reservoir
through A-annulus is not taken into account. Neither is blowout through the completion string.
The focus regarding requirements will be limited to Norway. However, governing regulations
regarding barriers will be provided both for the United States of America and for Norway.
Note that the reliability data used in this thesis are selected using specific filters for specific
applications in the databases. The reliability data can thus not be used as general data for other
applications.
Limitations included in the PFD calculations are listed in section 7.2.
1.4 Approach
Objective one will be based on reliability reports and technical reports provided by Exprosoft AS.
Some information will be found in ExproBase and on vendor’s web pages. Well barrier schemat-
ics and well barrier diagrams will be made for each configuration option. Based on these, ad-
vantages and disadvantages can be listed.
Objective two will be approached by the governing organisations web pages. Specific re-
quirements regarding barriers can be found in standards such as NORSOK, OLF and IEC.
Objective three will be based on the OLF 070 guideline. Some companies have made tech-
nical reports that provide detailed and structured information of how the safety analysis report
(SAR) can be made. These reports can make it easier to reach this objective.
Objective four and five can be based on reliability reports provided by ExproSoft AS. Infor-
mation on how to perform such calculations can also be found in reliability theory books such
as Rausand and Høyland (2004).
1.5 Structure of the Report
In agreement with supervisor, a summary in Norwegian is not included in this thesis.
Chapter two provides basic information about relevant well type, well equipment, gas lift
and well barriers. This is information which is relevant for the rest of the thesis and should be
used as a reference work when reading this report.
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Chapter three describes the various annular barrier configurations in gas lift applications in
Norway. These include a brief description of the maintenance strategy, advantages and disad-
vantages, well barrier schematics and well barrier diagrams. The well barrier diagrams are later
used to create fault trees when performing PFD calculations.
Chapter four defines important terms regarding annular safety. These terms are safety in-
strumented system (SIS) and safety instrumented function (SIF) which are fundamental terms
used in later chapters. The relationship between these terms and the configurations presented
in chapter 3 is presented through an example.
Chapter five provides information regarding requirements for annulus barriers. Governing
regulations in both the United States of America and Norway are first presented. A short inter-
pretation of these governing regulations follows. The following requirements are then limited to
Norway. The main NORSOK requirements are provided and presented through a table. OLF /
IEC requirements are then provided.
Chapter six provides descriptions of the safety analysis report (SAR) both for non-proven and
proven technology. This is illustrated in flowcharts and through an example which can be found
in appendix. The required documentation for non-proven and proven technology is compared
and differences are pointed out. Challenges when performing SAR are pointed out and potential
improvements to the OLF 070 guideline and IEC are proposed.
Chapter seven provides PFD calculations for all four configurations presented in chapter 3.
Reliability data are collected through various sources and used in the CARA Fault Tree software.
An overall assessment of the result are provided.
Chapter 2
Well Configuration, Well Equipment and
Barriers
The focus in this thesis is on annular barrier elements in offshore topside oil production wells,
which uses gas lift. This chapter provides information about how these wells are configured,
associated well equipment, gas lift systems and well barriers. This is basic information which is
needed to fully understand the rest of the report. Note that specific requirements are provided
for some components in this chapter.
2.1 Well Configuration
Oil production wells consist of the following main modules:
• The x-mas tree (XMT) which is a valve arrangement and an important part of the well
barrier system. It is placed on top of the wellhead and can be located either subsea or
topside.
• The wellhead (WH) which is a thick walled metal pipe attached to the surface casing. It
acts as a landing arrangement for the casings, and the XMT is connected at the top.
• The casing strings which consists of large diameter metal pipes which are cemented in
place during the drilling process.
8
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Completion String
A-annulus
B-annulus
C-annulus
Vertical X-Mas Tree
Wellhead
Casing
Seabed
Reservoir
Casing Cement
Figure 2.1: Main modules and cavities in a topside oil production well (ExproSoft, 2013)
• The casing cement which is used to seal between the formation and casing, and to sup-
port the casing.
• The completion string which consists of tubing and necessary equipment to achieve op-
timal flow performance and safety during production or injection.
The cavities in the well have different names:
• The A-annulus which is the annulus between the completion string and the production
casing.
• The B-annulus which is the annulus between the production casing and the intermediate
casing.
• The C-annulus which is the annulus between the intermediate casing and the surface
casing.
Gas production wells, water injection wells and gas injection wells have the same configuration
as oil production wells, but these are not in focus in this thesis. The main modules and cavities
is illustrated in figure 2.1 (ExproSoft, 2013).
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Production Swabb Valve
Completion String
Intermediate Casing
Production Casing
Reservoir
Annulus Master Valve
Annulus Wing Valve
Production Packer
Liner
Casing Shoe
Vertical X-Mas Tree
Lower Production Master Valve
Annulus Access
Valve
Annular Safety Valve Assembly
Modular Surface Annular Safety Valve
Kill Valve
Production Wing Valve
Upper Production Master Valve
Wellhead
Tubing Hanger
Casing Hanger
Blind Flange 
with Monitoring
Sidepocket Mandrels
Gaslift Valve
Valve Removal Prole & Plug
Lift Gas Pipeline
Flow LineKill Line
Production Stabs
Casing Spool
Spool Connector
Downhole Safety Valve
Choke Valve
Lift Gas
Packer Fluid
Oil
Surface Casing
Conductor Casing
Casing Cement
Figure 2.2: The main equipment in topside oil production wells based on (ExproSoft, 2013)
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2.2 Well Equipment
The main functionality of the well equipment is:
• Supporting the wellbore
• Well barrier elements
• Enhanced well flow performance
Typical well equipment for oil production wells is listed below and illustrated in figure 2.2.
2.2.1 X-Mas Tree (XMT)
The x-mas tree (XMT), also called production tree, is a valve arrangement and an important part
of the well barrier system. It is connected to the top of the WH and provides an interface from
the completion string to the piping towards the process system. There are three main types of
XMTs:
• Vertical topside XMT
• Vertical subsea XMT
• Horizontal subsea XMT (which contains the tubing hanger in addition to the valves)
Only vertical topside XMT is relevant in this case since this thesis focuses on gas lifted wells
and since M-SAS valves (see section 2.6.3) are only applicable in topside wells. The vertical
topside XMT valve arrangement consists of:
• Production master valve (PMV) which is an important well barrier element
• Production wing valve (PWV) which is located at the tree branch connected to the pipes
towards the process system
• Production swab valve (PSV) which is located at the top of the XMT and provides access
to the production bore when equipment is connected
• Kill valve (KV) which provides a secondary access point to the production bore
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• Production stabs which are short tubular making a production flow path between the
tubing hanger and the vertical Xmas tree. Seals on the stabs establish a cavity for testing
the connection seal between the WH and the Xmas tree.
(ExproSoft, 2013)
2.2.2 Wellhead (WH)
The WH is a thick walled metal pipe attached to the surface casing. The casings are landed
inside WH. Subsea and topside WH has different design. Only WHs for topside vertical XMTs
are relevant for this thesis and consist of:
• Annulus access valve (AAV) which is an inlet/outlet valve to the various annuli used for
isolation of pressure gauges or to adjusting annulus pressure
• Annulus master valve (AMV) which is a part of the well barrier system
• Annulus wing valve (AWV) which is a backup valve for the AMV and the primary valve
used for gas injection shut-in
• WH connector which is either a API flange or a quick connector
Note that WHs for vertical XMTs accommodate the tubing hanger for the completion string,
whereas for horizontal XMT the tubing hanger is located inside the XMT (ExproSoft, 2013).
Valve Removal (VR) Profile
A VR-profile is a hole in the WH wall which can be used to connect equipment such as an M-SAS
valve (see section 2.6.3) to the annulus. (ExproSoft, 2013).
2.2.3 Casing String
The casing string consists of large diameter metal pipes which are cemented in place during the
drilling process. The main purposes of the casing string are to:
• Prevent caving of formation wall into the wellbore
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• Maintain control of drilling fluids and pressure during drilling
• Keep formation and injection fluids inside the well during operation
• Be a structural foundation to support the WH, Blowout preventer (BOP), production packer,
etc.
The casing string typical consists of four types of casings:
• Conductor casing
• Surface casing
• Intermediate casing
• Production casing
Casings are sometimes extended using a liner. A liner is a casing clamped to the bottom part of
the previous casing and does not extend to the surface as casings do (ExproSoft, 2013).
2.2.4 Casing Cement
The casing cement is used to seal between the formation and the casing and to structurally
support the casing (ExproSoft, 2013).
2.2.5 Completion String
The completion string consists of tubing and necessary equipment to achieve optimal flow per-
formance and safety during production or injection. (See ExproSoft (2013)).
Tubing Hanger
The tubing hanger is located at the top of the completion string. Its purposes are to enable run,
hang-off, orient and lock, and seal the completion string on either inside the WH or inside a
horizontal XMT (ExproSoft, 2013).
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Downhole Safety Valve (DHSV)
The DHSV is a primary well barrier element located in the upper completion string. It consists
of a valve unit and an actuator. The purpose of the DHSV is to prevent uncontrolled flow of well
fluids from escaping though the tubing during an emergency. This is done by closing the valve
and thereby seal off the well (ExproSoft, 2013).
Side Pocket Mandrel (SPM)
The SPM is a tubular conduit in the completion string with a machined or welded side pocket.
The side pocket is used for housing inserted devices that require communication with the an-
nulus. The SPM is designed to avoid the inserted device obstructing the main completion string
conduit. Components are normally inserted or retrieved from the SPM by wireline using a kick-
over type running tool (ExproSoft, 2013).
Gas Lift Valve (GLV)
The GLV is located in a SPM some distance below the DHSV. It enables injection of gas from the
A-annulus to the completion string. Some GLVs are qualified as well barrier elements (WBE)
(ExproSoft, 2013).
Annular Safety Valve Assembly
The annular safety valve assembly is a WBE in injection and gas lift applications and consists of:
• A packer element to seal off the annulus of the well
• A slips element (hanger) to lock the annular safety valve assembly to the production cas-
ing
• An annulus safety valve (ASV) which consist of a body, an annulus sealing element which
can be activated, and control lines. Its purpose is to prevent flow of hydrocarbons or fluid
up the annulus and to provide a pressure seal between the bore and the A-annulus. (See
NORSOK, 2012, chapter 15.8 table 8).
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2.3 Artificial Lift
Oil and gas wells are either free flowing or lifted. Artificial lift methods are used to:
• Produce wells with insufficient reservoir pressure
• Produce wells with heavy oil
• Delay water production
• Increase the production rate
• Start wells after shut-in
The two most common methods of artificial lift are:
• Pump system where electronic submersible pumps (ESP) are the most common type
• Gas lift system in form of lift gas through annulus
These two systems are illustrated in figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: To the left: a gas lift well. To the right: a well using ESP (ExproSoft, 2013)
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2.3.1 Pump System
Pumps can either be submerged into the wellbore or positioned at the top of the well. There are
several categories of pumps but ESP is the most common type. Pumps create low pressure at the
inlet, and high pressure at the outlet, forcing the fluid up the completion string (Rigzone, 2013).
2.3.2 Lift Gas Systems
In gas lift systems, gas is pumped into the wellbore through the A-annulus and into the well
through the GLVs. The gas mixes with the fluids inside the completion string, reduces the fluid
viscosity and thereby increases the flow capability. The gas also reduces the hydrostatic pressure
inside the completion string and thus increases the differential pressure between the reservoir
and the bottom of the well (increased drawdown). This increases the production rate and is
sometimes a condition for starting the production. The mixture of oil and gas is produced to
the surface where the gas is separated from the oil and re-injected though the annulus (Rigzone
(2013) and ExproSoft (2013)).
2.4 Well Barrier
A well barrier is defined as an envelope of one or several WBE(s) preventing unintentional flow
of fluids from the formation into the wellbore, into another formation or the external environ-
ment (NORSOK, 2012). There are at least two independent barrier envelopes forming two sep-
arate layers of protection in hydrocarbon production wells in Norway. The first layer is called
the primary barrier layer (blue lines in figure 2.4). If this layer fails to control the hazard, the
secondary layer (red lines in figure 2.4) takes over. This is illustrated in figure 2.4. Note that the
formation is a part of both the primary and secondary well barrier envelope in addition to the
well equipment.
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Primary Barrier Envelope
Secondary Barrier Envelope
Figure 2.4: The primary (blue lines) and the secondary (red lines) well barrier envelopes
2.5 Gas Lift Barrier
A gas lift barrier is a barrier envelope that prevents flow to the environment from an artifi-
cial/injected gas lift source. Note that this is not the same as a well barrier which prevent flow to
the environment from the reservoir (NORSOK, 2012). However, some WBE may be common for
both well barrier and gas lift barrier. Figure 2.5 illustrate gas lift barrier envelopes.
Secondary Barrier Envelope
Primary Barrier Envelope
Figure 2.5: The primary (blue lines) and the secondary (red lines) gas lift barrier envelopes
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2.6 Well Barrier Element (WBE)
A well barrier element (WBE) is defined as a physical element which in itself does not prevent
flow but in combination with other WBEs forms a well barrier (See NORSOK, 2012, page 15).
Some of the WBEs are actuating items which are controlled by a safety instrumented system
(SIS) to close the barrier envelope. In conventional production wells, the primary actuating
item is the DHSV. The PMV in the XMT is the secondary actuating item.
In order to enable injection of gas and to complete the well barrier envelopes, the flow path
through the annulus introduced by gas lift, requires well equipment in addition to the DHSV
and the PMV. This is the gas lift valve (GLV), the annular safety valve assembly, and the modular
surface annular safety (M-SAS) valve.
2.6.1 Gas lift Valve (GLV)
The GLV is located in a SPM (see figure 2.6) some distance below the DHSV and enables injection
of gas from the A-annulus to the completion string. GLVs are used temporary for initial or late
life start-up of wells, or in continuous use in late life to compensate for reservoir depletion and
increased water cut.
Check valve
Lower seal
Upper seal
Inow port
Nozzle
Figure 2.6: A GLV placed in a SPM (ExproSoft, 2013)
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All GLVs have a check valve which prevents backflow from the completion string to the an-
nulus when reducing the pressure in A-annulus. All GLVs also have a nozzle to regulate the
maximum gas injection rate. The deepest set GLV is an operational GLV. Other GLVs above is
called unloading GLVs to assist during production start-up. GLVs located between the produc-
tion packer and the DHSV should be qualified as a primary well barrier. An alternative is to apply
an annular safety valve. The number of GLVs installed depends on the gas injection pressure,
the pressure integrity in the completion string or production casing, and the setting depth. In-
stallation is performed by wireline intervention using a kick-over type running tool (ExproSoft,
2013). According to (NORSOK, 2012), there is no specific requirement for the GLV as it is for the
ASV.
2.6.2 The Annular Safety Valve Assembly
The annular safety valve assembly is illustrated in figure 2.7 and consists of a packer element,
a slips element (hanger) and an annulus safety valve (ASV). The annular safety valve assembly
is integrated in the completion string and normally placed just below the DHSV to avoid the
control line to the DHSV to go through the annular safety valve assembly body.
Production Casing
Packer Element
Slips Element
Annulus Access Path
Completion String
Annulus Safety Valve
Figure 2.7: Components of the annular safety valve assembly
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Packer Element
A packer element seals off the annulus of the well. It is used between the production casing and
the completion string. The packer includes a flowpath for establishing fluid communication
with the annulus (Schlumberger (2013) and Engineering (2013)).
Slips Element (Hanger)
The slips element is used to lock the packer element inside the production casing to prevent ax-
ial movement (Engineering, 2013). The packer and the slips elements are placed in the produc-
tion casing by applying pressure trough a setting control line or by pressurizing the completion
string (ExproSoft, 2013).
The Annulus Safety Valve (ASV)
The ASV is both a well barrier and a gas lift barrier that controls the flow in the flow path that
bypasses the packer element. It is either located inside, below or above the packer element and
can either be an integrated part of the packer and slips or a separate component. Both systems
are tubing retrievable (TR). If the ASV is a separate component, a small size DHSV is normally
used. The various manufacturers use different designs for ASV and typical designs are illustrated
in figure 2.8 and listed below:
• Puppet
• Ball
• Flapper
Function: The ASV needs hydraulic pressure to open and to keep open. It is also a fail-safe close
device which is accomplished by compressing a spring when the hydraulic pressure is applied.
When the hydraulic pressure is cut or bleeds off, the spring returns to its original position and
thereby closes the valve. The annulus below the ASV is sealed when the ASV is closed and it is
possible to flow through the annulus and the bypass path in the packer when the ASV is open
(ExproSoft, 2013).
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Open Closed Closed ClosedOpen Open
Spring
Ball
Spring
Spring
Flapper
Puppet
Flow tube
Flow tube Flow tube
Figure 2.8: a ball valve to the left, a puppet valve in the middle and a flapper valve to the right
Installation and retrieval: The ASV is either pre-installed inside or connected to the packer ele-
ment which is integrated in the tubing. This means that the whole tubing down to the packer has
to be retrieved in order to retrieve the ASV. This requires costly and time-consuming workover.
Requirements: ASVs shall be designed and tested according to API RP 14B and located mini-
mum 50m below seabed and below the well kick off point. Setting depth shall be determined by
the possibility of forming hydrates and deposition of wax and scale if annulus is used for pro-
duction. The maximum setting depth shall be calculated based on the highest density of fluids
in the annulus.
It shall be verified for flow erosion resistance for all relevant fluids if it will be exposed to high
production or injection rates. If the ASV is a part of an annulus safety system, it shall comply with
ISO requirements such as for production packers.
ASVs shall have a working pressure (WP) which exceeds the maximum expected differen-
tial pressure (MEDP). It shall also be surface controlled, automatically operated, hydraulically
operated, and fail safe closed.
Leak tests shall be performed in the direction of flow using low pressure (maximum 70 bar
/ 1000 PSI) to MEDP. Increased testing frequency shall be considered when exposed to high
velocities. Leak tests shall be performed monthly until three consecutive qualified tests have
been performed. Thereafter, every three months, until three consecutive qualified tests have
been performed. Then every six months. Test duration shall be minimum 30 min (10 min for
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water). Acceptance of leak tests shall meet API RP 14B:
• 0,42 Sm3/min (25,5 Sm3/hr) (900 scf/hr) for gas
• 0,4 l/min (6,3 gal/hr) for liquid
Indirect measurement by pressure monitoring of an enclosed volume downstream of the
valve shall be performed if the leak rate cannot be measured directly. The valve and the emer-
gency shutdown function shall be periodically function tested based on reliability analysis, but
as a minimum yearly. Acceptable shutdown time shall be verified as well as the valve closing
on signal. The shutdown time is recorded at bleed down hydraulic system. (See NORSOK, 2012,
chapter 15.8 table 8).
Innovation: All ASVs used in Norway are currently hydraulic operated but Halliburton has de-
veloped an electrical DHSV (E-DHSV) which soon will be "proven in use". When this is done, it
is likely to believe that the E-DHSV will also be used as an ASV. However, much work remains in
order to qualify the E-DHSV as an E-ASV ((Seime, 2012)).
2.6.3 Modular Surface Annular Safety (M-SAS) Valve
The Modular Surface Annular Safety (M-SAS) valve is a WH mounted check valve that act as
a gas lift barrier. It is developed by Petroleum Technology Company (PTC) and is intended to
strengthen the secondary WBE (the AMV) and thereby open up for alternative configurations to
ASV. (The configurations are described in chapter 3).
Description: M-SAS comprises a valve unit and a hydraulic actuator unit. The valve unit is
screwed into the VR profile inside the WH wall, and a spool flange containing the hydraulic ac-
tuator unit is bolted to the valve unit outside the WH. The Annulus Master Valve (AMV) is further
bolted to the spool flange. This is illustrated in figure 2.9.
The M-SAS valve is kept in two modules to ensure that the valve closes if the hydraulic ac-
tuator unit is knocked off by an external hazard. The valve unit contains the closing mecha-
nism which is spring loaded to ensure fail-safe closure. The hydraulic actuator unit comprises
the control mechanism and consists of a hydraulic control line connection and a spring loaded
CHAPTER 2. WELL CONFIGURATION, WELL EQUIPMENT AND BARRIERS 23
Valve Unit Actuator Unit Annulus Master Valve
Hydraulic Control Line Connection
Spool Flange
Wellhead Wall
Gas From 
Compressor
Gas into
A-annulus
Figure 2.9: The M-SAS valve in open position mounted in a VR profile in a WH
flowtube.
Function: To open the valve, hydraulic fluid is pumped through the control line and into an
opening outside the flowtube. The pressure from the fluid causes the flowtube to move towards
the valve unit. This compresses the springs and the closing mechanism moves to open position.
When the valve is open, gas can flow through the valve in both directions. The valve closes if the
hydraulic pressure is lost or bleed off.
Installation: The M-SAS valve is installed into the VR profile using a hydraulic operated lu-
bricator (VR-tool). The VR tool is made for pressure contained installation or retrieval of various
plugs and valves through one or two gate valves. The VR tool typically replaces the AMV and acts
as a barrier element during installation or retrieval of the M-SAS valve and actuator.
The installation/replacement of M-SAS valves is less risky and less complicated than retriev-
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ing the ASV, requiring only light intervention. However, M-SAS installation can be fairly compli-
cated for existing wells where the space between the WHs or XMTs is limited (ExproSoft (2013)
and Andersen (2012)).
According to (NORSOK, 2012), there are no specific requirements for M-SAS.
Chapter 3
Gas Lift Configurations
The most common annular barrier configurations in gas lift applications in Norway is described
and discussed in this chapter. This includes configurations using M-SAS valve as a barrier ele-
ment. General advantages and disadvantages for each option are listed. Well barrier diagram
and schematics are provided for each configuration options.
3.1 Option 1: ASV + AMV
3.1.1 Strategy
An ASV and an AMV are used from day one. If the ASV fails, the AMV takes over and the ASV has
to be changed in order to obtain two barriers.
25
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3.1.2 Advantages
Table 3.1: Advantages using option 1
What Why
Low installation costs GLV (not qualified as a WBE) + ASV + AMV
Primary barrier protected against external haz-
ards
ASV located in the well
Can be used in subsea applications All barrier elements can be located subsea
Most used configuration M-SAS was developed in the beginning of 21th
century
Maintenance can normally take place when
other well equipment is maintained
3.1.3 Disadvantages
Table 3.2: Disadvantages using option 1
What Why
Expensive, risky and time-consuming when
ASV fails
ASV retrieval requires heavy workover (pulling
of tubing)
Secondary barrier is not protected against ex-
ternal hazards
AMV is located outside WH and can be knocked
off by falling objects
Large production loss when failure occurs Because of time-consuming workover
CHAPTER 3. GAS LIFT CONFIGURATIONS 27
Paker \ Seal
Valve
Primary Barrier
Secondary Barrier
Lift Gas
Oil
Cement
Voids
Manual valves in open position during operation 
Background colour for barrier elements and voids included in the FTA
Additional safeguard elements in the well barrier system
Symbols and colors in the well barrier schematics:
Colors in the well barrier diagrams:
Colors in the well barrier diagrams and the schematics:
Figure 3.1: Symbols and color descriptions in the well barrier schematics and diagrams
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Table 3.3: Barriers in option 1 (See NORSOK, 2012, page 70)
Primary Barrier Elements Verification / Monitoring Secondary Barrier Elements Verification / Monitoring
ASV (Actuating item) Periodic leak testing AMV Wellhead annulus valve
A and B (Actuating items) and
control line
Periodic leak testing
Production Casing Cement N/A after initial verification Intermediate Casing Cement Daily monitoring of C-Annulus
Production Casing Continuous pressure monitor-
ing of B-Annulus
Intermediate Casing Daily monitoring of C-Annulus
Production Packer N/A after initial verification Intermediate Casing Hanger
and Seal Assembly
Daily monitoring of C-Annulus /
Periodic leak testing
Completion String Periodic leak testing Tubing Hanger Periodic leak testing and contin-
uous pressure monitoring of A-
Annulus
DHSV (Actuating item) Periodic leak testing Wellhead Periodic leak testing
In-situ Formation N/A after initial verification XMT Periodic leak testing of valves
In-situ Formation N/A after initial verification
Flow Line
Kill Line
Well Head
X-mas tree
(Vertical Topside)
Lift Gas Pipe Line
AWV
DHSV
ASV
GLV (unloading)
GLV (unloading)
GLV (operational)
Production Packer
AMV
Figure 3.2: Well barrier schematics of option 1 (NORSOK (2012) and ExproSoft (2013)).
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Figure 3.3: Well barrier diagram for option 1 (Will be used in chapter 7).
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3.2 Option 2: AMV After ASV Failure
3.2.1 Strategy
Initially, an ASV is placed in the well and a spool flange with a protection sleeve is installed before
the AMV on the WH (just like option 1 but with a spool flange for the M-SAS valve). If the ASV
fails, the AMV takes over. Instead of changing ASV, the GLV(s) is qualified as primary WBE(s) and
an M-SAS valve is inserted to the spool flange at the WH to strengthen the secondary barrier and
to obtain two barriers.
3.2.2 Advantages
Table 3.4: Advantages using option 2
What Why
Primary barrier is protected against external
hazards
ASV and GLV is placed inside wellbore
Secondary barrier is protected against external
hazards
M-SAS is placed inside WH wall and protected
against falling objects
Low maintenance costs when ASV fails Only light intervention is needed. M-SAS valve
is inserted instead of retrieving ASV
Less risky than ASV retrieval Pulling of tubing is not required
Small production loss when M-SAS is used
compared to ASV workover
Quick maintenance compared to ASV retrieval
3.2.3 Disadvantages
Table 3.5: Disadvantages using option 2
What Why
Cannot be used in subsea applications M-SAS is only used in topside applications
Workover can be required regardless If the ASV is stuck in closed position
Medium installation cost GLV (qualified as WBE) + ASV + spool flange +
AMV
GLV has to be qualified as WBE In order to fulfill requirements
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Table 3.6: Barriers in option 2
Primary Barrier Elements Verification / Monitoring Secondary Barrier Elements Verification / Monitoring
ASV (Actuating item) Periodic leak testing AMV Wellhead annulus valve
A (Actuating item) and control
line
Periodic leak testing
Production Casing Cement N/A after initial verification M-SAS (Actuating item) Periodic leak testing
Production Casing Continuous pressure monitor-
ing of B-Annulus
Production Casing Cement Continuous monitoring of B-
Annulus
Production Packer N/A after initial verification Production Casing (Above pro-
duction packer)
Continuous monitoring of B-
Annulus
Completion String Periodic leak testing Production Casing and Casing
Hanger
Continuous monitoring of B-
Annulus/ Periodic leak testing
DHSV (Actuating item) Periodic leak testing Tubing Hanger Periodic leak testing and contin-
uous pressure monitoring of A-
Annulus
In-situ Formation N/A after initial verification Wellhead Periodic leak testing
XMT Periodic leak testing of valves
In-situ Formation N/A after initial verification
Flow Line
Kill Line
Well Head
X-mas tree
(Vertical Topside)
Lift Gas Pipe Line
AWV
DHSV
ASV
GLV (unloading)
GLV (unloading)
GLV (operational)
Production Packer
AMV
M-SAS valve
M-SAS actuator
Figure 3.4: Well barrier schematics of option 2 (ExproSoft, 2013).
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Figure 3.5: Well barrier diagram for option 2 (Will be used in chapter 7) (Based on ExproSoft
(2013)).
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3.3 Option 3: ASV + AMV + M-SAS
3.3.1 Strategy
An ASV, an AMV, an M-SAS valve and WBE qualified GLV(s) are installed from day one (almost
the same as option 2 but an M-SAS valve is also included). If the ASV fails, the GLV(s) takes over
as primary WBE(s).
3.3.2 Advantages
Table 3.7: Advantages using option 3
What Why
No need for workover/ intervention when first
failure occurs
M-SAS is already in place and GLV(s) is already
qualified as WBE
Primary barrier is protected against external
hazards
ASV and GLV is located inside wellbore
Secondary barrier is protected against external
hazards
M-SAS is located inside WH wall
No production loss when initial failure occurs No workover / intervention is needed
3.3.3 Disadvantages
Table 3.8: Disadvantages using option 3
What Why
Has the highest installation cost GLV (qualified as WBE) + ASV + M-SAS + AMV
Cannot be used in subsea applications M-SAS is only used in topside applications
Workover can be required regardless If ASV stuck in closed position
GLV has to be qualified as WBE In order to fulfill requirements
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Table 3.9: Barriers in option 3
Primary Barrier Elements Verification / Monitoring Secondary Barrier Elements Verification / Monitoring
ASV (Actuating item) Periodic leak testing AMV Wellhead annulus valve
A and B (Actuating items) and
control line
Periodic leak testing
Production Casing Cement N/A after initial verification M-SAS (Actuating item) Periodic leak testing
Production Casing Continuous pressure monitor-
ing of B-Annulus
Intermediate Casing Daily monitoring of C-Annulus
Production Packer N/A after initial verification Intermediate Casing Cement Daily monitoring of C-Annulus
Completion String Periodic leak testing Intermediate Casing Hanger
and Seal Assembly
Daily monitoring of C-Annulus /
Periodic leak testing
DHSV (Actuating item) Periodic leak testing Tubing Hanger Periodic leak testing and contin-
uous pressure monitoring of A-
Annulus
In-situ Formation N/A after initial verification Wellhead Periodic leak testing
XMT Periodic leak testing of valves
In-situ Formation N/A after initial verification
Flow Line
Kill Line
Well Head
X-mas tree
(Vertical Topside)
Lift Gas Pipe Line
AWV
DHSV
ASV
GLV (unloading)
GLV (unloading)
GLV (operational)
Production Packer
AMV
M-SAS valve
M-SAS actuator
Figure 3.6: Well barrier schematics of option 3 (ExproSoft, 2013).
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Figure 3.7: Well barrier diagram for option 3 (Will be used in chapter 7).
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3.4 Option 4: AMV + M-SAS
3.4.1 Strategy
ASV is not used. Instead, WBE qualified GLV(s) is used from day one. M-SAS is used as secondary
WBE from day one along with AMV to strengthen the barrier. If primary WBE (GLV) fails, it can
be replaced by wireline operations.
3.4.2 Advantages
Table 3.10: Advantages using option 4
What Why
Very low installation costs GLV + M-SAS + AMV
No workover is required Only wireline intervention for GLV. Lubricator
and VR tool for M-SAS
Primary barrier is protected against external
hazards
GLV is located inside wellbore
Secondary barrier is protected against external
hazards
M-SAS is located inside WH wall
Low cost maintenance compared to ASV
workover
Only light intervention is required in order to
retrieve GLV and M-SAS
Low risk when performing maintenance com-
pared to ASV workover
Only light intervention is required
3.4.3 Disadvantages
Table 3.11: Disadvantages using option 4
What Why
Cannot be used in subsea applications M-SAS can only be placed topside
Small production loss when intervention is per-
formed
Intervention is quicker and less complicated
than workover
GLV has to be qualified as WBE In order to fulfil requirements
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Table 3.12: Barriers in option 4
Primary Barrier Elements Verification / Monitoring Secondary Barrier Elements Verification / Monitoring
GLV (Actuating item) Periodic leak testing AMV Wellhead annulus valve
A (Actuating item) and control
line
Periodic leak testing
Production Casing Cement N/A after initial verification M-SAS (Actuating item) Periodic leak testing
Production Casing Continuous pressure monitor-
ing of B-Annulus
Production Casing (Above Pro-
duction Packer)
Continuous monitoring of B-
Annulus
Production Packer N/A after initial verification Casing Hanger Continuous monitoring of B-
Annulus/ Periodic leak testing
Completion String Periodic leak testing Tubing Hanger Periodic leak testing and contin-
uous pressure monitoring of A-
Annulus
DHSV (Actuating item) Periodic leak testing Wellhead Periodic leak testing
In-situ Formation N/A after initial verification XMT Periodic leak testing of valves
In-situ Formation N/A after initial verification
Flow Line
Kill Line
Well Head
X-mas tree
(Vertical Topside)
Lift Gas Pipe Line
AWV
DHSV
ASV
GLV (unloading)
GLV (unloading)
GLV (operational)
Production Packer
AMV
M-SAS valve
M-SAS actuator
Figure 3.8: Well barrier schematics of option 4 (ExproSoft, 2013).
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Figure 3.9: Well barrier diagram for option 4 (Will be used in chapter 7).
Chapter 4
Annular Safety
This chapter provides definitions of terms which are important in order to understand the an-
nular safety system in lift gas applications as well as the requirements chapter (chapter 5). These
terms are safety instrumented systems (SIS) and safety instrumented functions (SIF).
4.1 Safety Instrumented System (SIS)
Annular safety in lift gas applications is provided by a safety instrumented systems (SIS) which
is defined as:
"an independent protection layer that is installed to migrate the risk associated
with the operation of a specified hazardous system, which is referred to as the equip-
ment under control (EUC). An SIS is composed of sensors, logic solvers, and actuat-
ing items"
(See Rausand and Høyland, 2004, section 10.2)
4.2 Safety Instrumented Function (SIF)
A SIS has one or more safety instrumented function (SIF) where a SIF is defined as:
"a function that is implemented by a SIS and that is intended to achieve or main-
tain a safe state for the EUC with respect to a specific process demand."
39
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(See Rausand and Høyland, 2004, section 10.2)
A SIS has two main system functions:
1. When a predefined process demand (deviation) occurs in the EUC, the deviation shall be
detected by the SIS sensors, and the required actuating items shall be activated and fulfil
their intended functions.
2. The SIS shall not be activated spuriously, that is, without the presence of a predefined
process demand (deviation) in the EUC.
A failure of the first function is referred to as fail to function (FTF), and a failure of the second
function is called a spurious trip (ST) (See Rausand and Høyland, 2004, section 10.2)
4.3 Annuls Safety Systems as a Part of SIS
The annulus safety system is used as an example to illustrate the relation between the terms SIS
and SIF in this case:
The annulus safety system is a part of the emergency shutdown (ESD) system in gas lift wells
along with the production bore safety system. This ESD system is an example of a SIS and in this
case the SIS includes:
• Sensors such as fire or heat detectors, pressure transmitters, etc.
• Actuating items which is the ASV, AMV and M-SAS valve
• Logic solver(s) which receives signals from the sensors and sends signals to the actuating
items
The SIF for this SIS is to shut of the EUC which in this case is the annulus reservoir (A-annulus).
This is illustrated in figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: The SIS which contains sensors, a logic solver and actuating items to shut of the
annulus reservoir (EUC).
Chapter 5
Annular Safety Requirements
An overview of requirements regarding annular safety systems is provided in this chapter. This
includes governing regulations in the United States of America (USA) and in Norway, and Nor-
wegian requirements regarding SIS. The main SIS project phases, SIS requirements and SIS doc-
umentation according to the OLF 070 guideline are provided.
5.1 Governing Regulations
Governing regulations for the oil and gas industry are provided by most countries. These are
overall requirements which have to be interpreted. Governing regulations regarding well barri-
ers in USA and Norway are provided and interpreted.
5.1.1 The United States of America
The oil and gas production in USA is managed by The Bureau of Safety and Environmental En-
forcement (BSEE) which provides regulations regarding well barriers. According to BSEE, it is
required to equip new wells or gas lift wells with at least one master valve and one surface safety
valve above the master valve in the vertical run of the XMT (See BSEE, 2013a, §250.518d).
The BSEE requirement also states that all tubing installations in contact with zones contain-
ing hydrocarbon shall be equipped with subsurface safety devices that will shut off the flow from
the well in the event of an emergency unless it is incapable of natural flowing. These devices can
42
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consist of e.g. a surface-controlled subsurface safety valve (SCSSV), or a tubing/annular subsur-
face safety device. (see BSEE, 2013b, §250.801a).
According to BSEE, gas lift or water-injection pipelines on unmanned platforms need to be
equipped with an Flow Safety Valve (FSV) installed immediately upstream of each casing annu-
lus or the first inlet valve on the XMT (see BSEE, 2013c, §250.1004 b(7)).
5.1.2 Norway
The regulatory authority for technical and operational safety for the petroleum industry in Nor-
way is named Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) (Norway, 2013a). According to PSA reg-
ulations, barriers shall be established to reduce the probability of failures, hazard and accident
situations developing, and to limit possible harm and disadvantages. There shall be sufficient
independence between barriers where more than one is needed. (See Norway, 2013b, section
5). PSA also provides the following requirements regarding well barriers:
"During drilling and well activities, there shall be tested well barriers with suf-
ficient independence" ... "If a barrier fails, activities shall not be carried out in the
well other than those intended to restore the barrier." (See Norway, 2013c, section
85).
"The flow line and annulus shall be equipped with necessary downhole safety
valves (SCSSV) and necessary equipment for monitoring well parameters." (See Nor-
way, 2013d, section 53).
"The christmas tree shall have at least two main valves, and at least one of them
shall be automatic" (See Norway, 2013e, section 53).
5.1.3 Interpretation of Governing Regulations
The American governing regulations can be interpreted as a requirement of at least two inde-
pendent barriers against reservoir and at least one barrier element against the annulus reservoir.
The Norwegian governing regulations can be interpreted as a requirement of at least two
independent barriers against the reservoir. The barriers against annulus reservoir are not de-
scribed directly in the Norwegian governing regulations but it is recommend using NORSOK
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standards to fulfil the requirements. NORSOK recommend at least two independent barriers
against annuls reservoir. See section 5.2. The interpretations are illustrated in table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Interpretation of governing regulations regarding well barriers in USA and Norway
USA Norway
Primary WBE x x
Secondary WBE x x
Annulus primary WBE x x
Annulus secondary WBE - x
5.2 NORSOK
NORSOK is a national standards organization and has been approved by PSA as a provider of
standards to fulfil the functional requirements in Norway. NORSOK regulations regarding bar-
riers state that there shall be at least two independent and tested barriers available between the
reservoir and the environment to prevent unintentional flow from the well during production
activities. The position of the barrier shall be known at all times and the barrier shall be de-
signed for re-establishment of a lost barrier. The XMT is defined as one barrier during normal
production. The DHSV is normally the other barrier (See NORSOK, 2002, section 5.17.2).
Special requirements regarding gas lift wells are also provided by NORSOK: The volume of
released hydrocarbon gas due to accidental damage to XMT, WH or surface lines shall be min-
imized. All gas lifted platform wells shall therefore have an ASV installed in the A-annulus. An
alternative to ASV, if safety level can be documented same or better than an ASV system, is to
use a WH fail safe close device in combination with WBE qualified GLV.
A WBE qualified GLV can be used as an alternative to an ASV in subsea wells if a risk analysis
is conducted and shows acceptable risk. It is also required to perform a risk analysis regarding
hydrocarbon gas release if barriers are lost, use tested gas tight premium connections for the
production casing and completion string, constant monitoring and alarms of the B-annulus
in platform wells, design B-annulus to withstand effect of thermal induced pressure in subsea
wells, and to evaluate monitoring of B-annulus in subsea wells (See NORSOK, 2012, section
7.7.2). Table 5.2 shows recommended WBEs according to NORSOK. This includes alternative
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configurations for topside gas lift and subsea applications.
Table 5.2: Additional documentation and primary and secondary barrier elements against reser-
voir and against annular reservoir according to NORSOK (NORSOK, 2012).
All wells Option for topside Option for
lift gas wells subsea wells
Primary WBE DHSV DHSV DHSV
Secondary WBE PMV PMV PMV
Annulus primary WBE ASV GLV GLV
Annulus secondary WBE AMV M-SAS + AMV AMV
Additional documentation - Acceptable safety Acceptable risk
5.3 OLF / IEC
In Norway, there are several guidelines to be followed in order to fulfil the governing regulations.
Each regulation paragraph has at least one guideline. OLF 070 is an example of a guideline which
is developed specific for SIS. According to the Facilities Regulations §8 provided by PSA, OLF 070
shall be used in design and performance of SIFs. IEC 61508 is the basis for specification, design
and operation of SIS and IEC 61511 is the process industry’s own sector specific standard for
application of SIS. OLF 070 is a simplification of these international standards (OLF, 2004).
5.3.1 Safety Integrity Level (SIL)
Safety integrity is a fundamental concept in IEC 61508 and is classified into four discrete lev-
els called Safety Integrity Levels (SIL). SIL is defined by the probability of failure on demand
(PFD) which is the probability of system or component failure if a demand occurs. OLF 070
both provides SIL requirements and proposed activities to fulfil these requirements throughout
the various SIS project phases.
5.3.2 SIL Requirements
According to OLF 070, there are three main requirements that need to be fulfilled in order to
achieve a given SIL:
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• Quantitative PFD requirements
• Quantitative architectural requirements
• Avoidance and control of systematic failures
(See OLF, 2004, section 8.5). Descriptions of the above requirements follows:
Quantitative PFD Requirements
This is a quantitative requirement expressed as PFD or alternatively as the probability of a dan-
gerous failure per hour. This shall include:
• Random hardware failures
• Common cause failures
• If relevant, failures of any data communication systems used to support the safety func-
tion.
Table 5.3 shows the various SIL and corresponding PFD value. The table is divided into:
• Continuous demand mode, which is processes where demands occur all the time. This is
applications such as exothermic reactors.
• Demand mode, which are processes where demands do not occur continuously. This is
applications such as emergency shutdown (ESD) systems.
Table 5.3: The various SIL and corresponding PFD values (see OLF, 2004, table 8.1).
SIL Demand Mode of Operation (Average
probability of failure to perform its de-
sign function on demand - PFD)
Continuous / High Demand Mode of
Operation (Probability of a dangerous
failure per hour)
4 ≥ 10−5 to < 10−4 ≥ 10−9 to < 10−8
3 ≥ 10−4 to < 10−3 ≥ 10−8 to < 10−7
2 ≥ 10−3 to < 10−2 ≥ 10−7 to < 10−6
1 ≥ 10−2 to < 10−1 ≥ 10−6 to < 10−5
OLF 070 defines minimum SIL requirements for various SIS and is also a guideline of how to
handle deviations from the minimum SIL requirement (See OLF, 2004, section 7.6 and 7.7).
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ASV, M-SAS and AMV are not directly mentioned in table 7.1 in OLF 070 which lists the min-
imum SIL requirements for various safety functions. However, ASV systems in gas lift wells are a
part of the ESD system for isolation of topside well which has minimum SIL requirement of SIL
3. According to table 8.1 in OLF 070, SIL 3 is defined as PFD more or equal to 10−4 to less than
10−3 for demand mode operation.
Quantitative Architectural Requirements
This is a quantitative requirement expressed in terms of architectural constraints on the sub-
systems constituting safety function. Architectural constrains on hardware safety integrity are
given by:
• The hardware fault tolerance (HFT) of the subsystem. (The number of faults that could
cause loss of safety function.)
• The safe failure fraction (SFF) (The fraction of failures which can be considered safe since
they are detected, or do not cause loss of the safety function.)
• Whether the subsystem is of “A-type or B-type” where for A-type, all possible failure modes
can be determined for all components and where for B-type, the behaviour under fault
conditions cannot be determined for at least one component. (In practice B-type will
be for systems using programmable electrical components since their behaviour under
fault conditions can be hard to determine and A-type will be for systems without pro-
grammable electrical components.) (See iec, 2010b, sub clause 7.4).
Architectural requirements according to OLF 070 are shown in table 5.4 (for A-type subsys-
tems) and in table 5.5 (for B-type subsystems).
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Table 5.4: Hardware safety integrity: architectural constrains on type A safety-related subsys-
tems (iec (2010b), Table 2 and OLF (2004) Table 8.2)
Safe failure fraction Hardware fault tolerance
0 1 2
< 60% SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3
60% - 90% SIL 2 SIL 3 SIL 4
90% - 99% SIL 3 SIL 4 SIL 4
> 99% SIL 3 SIL 4 SIL 4
Table 5.5: Hardware safety integrity: architectural constrains on type B safety-related subsys-
tems (iec (2010b), Table 3 and OLF (2004) Table 8.3)
Safe failure fraction Hardware fault tolerance
0 1 2
< 60% Not allowed SIL 1 SIL 2
60% - 90% SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3
90% - 99% SIL 2 SIL 3 SIL 4
> 99% SIL 3 SIL 4 SIL 4
Avoidance and Control of Systematic Failures
This is requirements concerning which techniques and measures should be used to avoid and
control systematic faults. These are systematic faults that are introduced during specification,
design, operation or maintenance/testing, which may result in a failure of the safety function
under certain conditions. (See OLF, 2004, chapter 8)
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5.3.3 SIS Project Phases
Feasibility Phase
Concept Phase
Commisioning and Start-Up
Decommisioning Phase
SRS
SAR
Updates of
Failure
Data
Pre Execution Phase
Detailed Engineering Phase
Operational Phase
Safety Management Plan
Project Phases
Documentation
SRS Final
Most important phases regarding documentation
Final SIL Calculations Not ok?
Cancel
More redundancy
or back to concept
phase
Figure 5.1: SIS phases and documentation (based on OLF, 2004, fig E1a and E1b)
Figure 5.1 shows the various project phases and the main documentation generated through-
out the life cycle of a SIS. After the concept phase, the three most important phases regarding
documentation are the Pre Execution Phase (in this case: Pre SIS design and engineering phase),
the Detailed Engineering Phase (in this case: SIS design and engineering phase) and the Oper-
ational Phase. These three phases are highlighted in gray on figure 5.1 and briefly explained
below:
• Pre SIS design and engineering phase: In this phase, the design basis is made for the
SIS design phase. This is included in the Safety Requirement Specification (SRS). The first
version of SRS is also made in this phase.
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• SIS design and engineering phase: In this phase, the SIS is designed according to the
SRS. SIS components are ordered from subcontractors. A Factory Acceptance Test (FAT) is
performed and a Safety Analysis Report (SAR) is made and delivered along with each SIS
component.
• Operational Phase: After the SIS is installed, the operational phase can begin. This im-
plies data collection, testing, maintenance, failure data updates, and modifications which
provides input to new versions of the SRS.
(OLF, 2004).
5.3.4 Required SIS Documentation
In order to qualify components as SIS components, basically two documents have to be pro-
vided in addition to manuals. This is the SRS and the SAR.
Safety Requirement Specification (SRS)
SRS provides the design basis for the SIS design and engineering phase. IEC 61511-1 chapter 10
describes the content of SRS in form of a series of requirements. According to OLF 070, the SRS
shall contain:
• Functional requirements and descriptions such as capacities and response times
• Integrity requirements such as PFD and SIL
• Operating prerequisites and constraints
A more detailed SRS content is provided in appendix B (adopted from ConocoPhillips (2013a)
and based on iec (2003), chapter 10). The SRS shall be regularly updated throughout the lifetime
of the SIS in form of new versions. (See OLF (2004), section 7.8 and appendix E.2).
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Safety Analysis Report (SAR)
Based on the SRS (see previous subsection), one can start the SIS design and engineering phase
as described in OLF 070 chapter 8. SARs shall be a part of the final documentation in this project
phase and shall document how each supplier of SIS components has implemented require-
ments set by IEC 61508 and IEC 61511. One SAR is typically made for each component in a SIF
but several components may be documented in the same SAR. According to OLF 070 chapter
8.10, the SAR shall include:
• System description
• System topology and block diagram
• Operational description of the system
• Failure rate of the components
• Recommended time interval between functional testing
• Mean Time to Repair (MTTR)
• Diagnostic coverage
• Voting
• Common cause failures
• Behavior of system on detection of a fault
• Avoidance and control of systematic failures
• If relevant: PFD calculations
Subcontractors have various ways of structuring a SAR which is normally documented in a SAR
template. An example of such a SAR template is shown in appendix C which also describes the
SAR content great detail. Another example can be found in OLF (2004) appendix E.3.
There are reduced requirements for SAR documentation related to systematic failures if a SIS
component is claimed to be:
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• Proven in use
• Prior use
• Low complexity
However, a structure quality assurance (QA) system must be included or / and an ISO 9000 cer-
tification or better. Definitions of the above expressions follow:
Low complexity: A component is of low complexity if dependable field experience exists and if
it is in accordance with definition in IEC 61508-4, clause 3.4.3: It is an Electric / Electronic / Pro-
grammable Electronic (E/E/PE) safety-related system which is defined as a designed system that
both implements safety functions necessary to achieve or maintain a safe state for the EUC. It
must also intend to achieve the necessary safety integrity for the required safety functions. Also
two other conditions need to be fulfilled in order to achieve low complexity:
• The failure modes of each individual component are well defined
• The behaviour of the system under fault conditions can be completely determined
The behaviour of the system under fault conditions may be determined by analytical and/or test
methods.
Based on the above description, a low complexity component is similar to a type A safety
related subsystem which is described in section 5.3.2 under Quantitative Architectural Require-
ments.
If low complexity is claimed and the SAR template in appendix C is used, low complexity
documentation shall be given in SAR chapter 8 - Architectural constraints (HFT and voting prin-
ciples) (See iec (2010a), clause 4.2, iec (2010c), clause 3.4.3, and ConocoPhillips (2013b)).
Proven in use: A component is proven in use if in compliance with requirements in IEC 61508-
2, clause 7.4.10.1 to 7.4.10.7. According to IEC 61508-2, an element shall only be regarded as
proven in use when it has clearly restricted and specified functionality and when there is ade-
quate documentary evidence to demonstrate that the likelihood of any dangerous systematic
faults is low enough that the required SIL of the SIF that use the element is achieved. Evidence
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shall be based on analysis of operational experience of a specific configuration of the element
together with suitability analysis and testing. (See iec, 2010b, clause 7.4.10.1))
According to ConocoPhillips (2013b), a component can be considered proven in use if the
failure data can be based on:
• More than 10 inventories or more than 50 critical failures
• More than 50000 hours calendar/operational time
• More than 2 installations covered
• More than 1 operator covered
If the component is claimed proven in use and the SAR template in appendix C is used, proven
in use shall be documented in SAR chapter 14 - Avoidance and control of systematic failures. QA
certificates and/or procedures shall then be attached to the SAR (ConocoPhillips, 2013b).
Prior use: Requirements for claiming prior use are described in IEC 61511-1 clause 11.5. Ac-
cording to IEC 61511-1 clause 11.5.3.1, it is required to prove that the components and sub-
systems are suitable for use in SIS. According to IEC 61511-1 clause 11.5.3.2, the evidence of
suitability shall include:
• Consideration of the manufacturer’s quality, management and configuration management
systems
• Adequate identification and specification of the components or subsystems
• Demonstration of the performance of the components or subsystems in similar operating
profilers and physical environments
• The volume of the operating experience
If the component is claimed prior use, this shall be documented in SAR chapter 14 - Avoid-
ance and control of systematic failures. QA certificates and/or procedures shall then be attached
to the SAR. (See iec (2003) clause 11.5.3 and ConocoPhillips (2013b)).
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5.3.5 Responsibility
According to OLF 070, it is important that an organization or a responsible person is identified
for each phase of the SIS safety life cycle. When a SIS is developed, the operators order various
components from different vendors. According to OLF 070 section 8.2, such vendors can be:
• Engineering contractors that is given the task to do the SIS engineering
• Systems suppliers that provide the SIS
• Control systems vendors
• Field equipment vendors
(OLF, 2004).
The vendors are responsible for making and delivering the component and a SAR to docu-
ment according to requirements in the SRS. The operator qualification team is responsible for
the handover to the requisitioner. The requisitioner is responsible for the final technology ap-
proval. In Norway, PSA provides regulations and ensure that the regulations are fulfilled (see
OLF (2004) and ExproSoft (2013)).
Chapter 6
The Safety Analysis Report (SAR) Process
The SAR process for both proven and non-proven technology are described in this chapter. This
is done by firstly interpreting the requirements of documentation for non-proven and proven
technology. Flow diagrams are provided for the different documentation scenarios. Two cases
are used to illustrate and exemplify the SAR processes:
• A hydraulically operated ASV (H-ASV) represents proven technology
• An electrically operated ASV (E-ASV) represents non-proven technology
Challenges when performing SAR are pointed out and improvements to the guidelines are pro-
posed.
6.1 Reduction of SIS Documentation
According to OLF 070, the necessary documentation for non-proven technology is the SRS and
the SAR. The SRS content is described in section 5.3.4 and includes the design basis which is
used to create the SAR. The SRS content can thus not be reduced. However, the SAR content
may be reduced by either claiming low complexity, proven in use or prior use for the component
as described in section 5.3.4. This is illustrated in figure 6.1.
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Package specication 
/ SRS
Proven
technology?
Low
complexity?
Reduction in
SAR documentation
Further reduction in
SAR documentation
No further reduction in
SAR documentation
Reduction in
SAR documentation
No reduction in
SAR documentation
Low
complexity?
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Proven Technology
Non-proven Technology
Figure 6.1: Possible ways of reducing SAR documentation for SIS components
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The SAR content is described in accordance to OLF 070 in section 5.3.4. Each vendor or
subcontractors has normally their own SAR template. An example of a SAR template is shown
in table 6.1 which is the same as in appendix C.
Table 6.1: Example of a SAR template (ConocoPhillips, 2013b)
| Abbrevations
|| References
||| Summary
1. Introduction
2. System description
3. System topology and block diagram
4. Operational description of the system
5. Assumptions
6. Failure rate of the components
7. Diagnostic coverage & Safe failure fraction
8. Architectural constraints (HFT and voting principles)
9. Common cause failures
10. Behaviour of system/components on detection of fault
11. Mean time to repair
12. Factory testing
13. Operational testing (incl. test procedures and recommended functional test interval)
14. Avoidance and control of systematic failures
15. Software documentation
16. Results
Appendices
Note that all the chapters in table 6.1 are included in the SAR if the SAR template in appendix
C is used, but the content in some of the chapters may vary and depends on whether the com-
ponent is non-proven or proven.
6.2 Non-Proven Technology
Non-proven technology are components that are either under development or already devel-
oped but not used enough to be claimed proven in use or prior use. In other words, not enough
field experience exists and thereby not enough proof is available for the technology to be proven
suitable for its use. Non-proven technology can thus either be of low complexity or of high com-
plexity (type A or type B subsystem). This is illustrated in figure 6.2.
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Non-proven Technology
Low Complexity
(type A subsystem)
High Complexity
(type B subsystem)
Figure 6.2: Possible claims for non-proven technology
6.2.1 Required Documentation of Non-Proven Technology
The only way of reducing SAR documentation for non-proven components is by claiming low
complexity. This is illustrated in figure 6.1. The conditions for claiming low complexity are
described in section 5.3.4. If low complexity is claimed, this documentation shall be given in
SAR chapter 8 - Architectural constraints (HFT and voting principles) if the SAR template in
table 6.1 / appendix C is used. There are then no requirements for documentation of handling
of systematic failures, but QA system must be in place and be documented. If low complexity
cannot be claimed for the component, it is not possible to reduce the SAR documentation.
6.2.2 SAR Process for Non-Proven Technology
If low complexity is claimed, the SAR process can be done in accordance with figure 6.3. If not,
the SAR process must be done as described in figure 6.4. The differences are highlighted with
blue colour in the two figures.
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SRS
Hardware Requirement
Develop failure rates based on 
FMECA, eld experience, etc. 
Document low complexity
system under architectural
constrains. No requirement for 
documentation of handling 
of systematic failures
Document relevant information
in Safety Analysis Report (SAR)
Software Requirement
See IEC61508-3 and IEC61511-1 
clause 12 for software 
requirements 
SAR
Develop PFD based on test interval in SRS and λDU.  Develop SSF by using 
λDU and λTOTAL. Compare results against SIL requirements in SRS. HFT 
requirement is developed from SSF, SIL and equipment type (A/B). 
Ref IEC61508-2 clause 7.4.3.1 and IEC 61511 clause 11.4
Component
OK vs SIL 
requirements
 ?
Yes
No
Contact SRS owner to evaluate
wether to redesign or apply 
deviationRedesign Deviation
Figure 6.3: SAR process for non-proven low complexity claimed components. (Based on OLF,
2004, figure E2)
CHAPTER 6. THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (SAR) PROCESS 60
SRS
Document avoidance and control of systematic failures. Ref. IEC61508-2 
clause 7.4.4 & 7.4.5 and OLF 070 annex A & B. Detailed completion of 
tables in annex A & B is regarded as compilance with requirements. 
Alternatively, document functional safety management system. 
Ref. IEC61511-1 clause 5
Document relevant information
in Safety Analysis Report (SAR)
SAR
Contact SRS owner to evaluate
wether to redesign or apply 
deviationRedesign Deviation
Hardware Requirement
Develop failure rates based on 
FMECA, eld experience, etc. 
Software Requirement
See IEC61508-3 and IEC61511-1 
clause 12 for software 
requirements 
Develop PFD based on test interval in SRS and λDU.  Develop SSF by using 
λDU and λTOTAL. Compare results against SIL requirements in SRS. HFT 
requirement is developed from SSF, SIL and equipment type (A/B). 
Ref IEC61508-2 clause 7.4.3.1 and IEC 61511 clause 11.4
Component
OK vs SIL 
requirements
 ?
Yes
No
Figure 6.4: SAR process for non-proven components that cannot claim low complexity. (Based
on OLF, 2004, figure E2)
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Example using an electrical ASV
An E-ASV is used as an example of non-proven technology. Such a component is considered a
low complexity system if it does not contain any programmable logic solver. It may be slightly
more complex than a hydraulic ASV but no new failure modes are added. The behaviour under
fault condition will be possible to determine since failure modes are known. Therefore, figure
6.3 has to be used and the content of the SAR can be as described in appendix C. Reduction in
documentation will be possible by documenting low complexity in SAR chapter 8 - Architectural
constraints. There is also no requirement for documentation of handling of systematic failures,
but QA system must be in place and be documented. See appendix D for details.
6.3 Proven Technology
Proven technology has the obvious advantage over non-proven technology because it is already
proven suitable for its use. This implies available data and documentation from previous use.
Proven technology can thus be defined as technology (either low or high complexity) which is
already developed and verified as either proven in use or prior use as described in section 5.3.4.
This is illustrated in figure 6.5.
Proven Technology
Low Complexity
High Complexity
Proven in Use
Prior Use
Low Complexity
High Complexity
Figure 6.5: Possible verifications and claims for proven technology
6.3.1 Required Documentation of Proven Technology
The SAR content for proven technology will be reduced both for proven in use certified com-
ponents and for prior use certified components. This is illustrated in figure 6.1 and implies to
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document proven in use or prior use in SAR chapter 14 - Avoidance and control of systematic
failures if the SAR template in table 6.1 / appendix C are used. QA certificates and/or procedures
shall then be attached to the SAR. In addition, proven technology can be claimed low complex-
ity which will reduce the documentation further. This is also illustrated in figure 6.1 and implies
documenting low complexity in SAR chapter 8 - Architectural constraints (HFT and voting prin-
ciples) if the SAR template in table 6.1 / appendix C is used.
6.3.2 SAR Process for Proven Technology
The SAR process can be done as described in figure 6.6 for proven technology (Proven in use
or prior use certified components). If the component is also considered low complexity, as de-
scribed in section 5.3.4, the SAR process can be done according to figure 6.7. However, the latter
may be of excess and thus unnecessary. This is because the documentation of low complex-
ity is included in the certificate documentation of proven in use / prior use in such cases. The
differences are highlighted with blue colour in the two figures.
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SRS
Document relevant information
in Safety Analysis Report (SAR)
SAR
Contact SRS owner to evaluate
wether to redesign or apply 
deviationRedesign Deviation
Document proven in use or prior use under avoidance and control of 
systematic failures. No requirement for documentation of handling of 
systematic failures, but QA system must be in place and documented.
Hardware Requirement
Develop failure rates based on 
FMECA, eld experience, etc. 
Software Requirement
See IEC61508-3 and IEC61511-1 
clause 12 for software 
requirements 
Develop PFD based on test interval in SRS and λDU.  Develop SSF by using 
λDU and λTOTAL. Compare results against SIL requirements in SRS. HFT 
requirement is developed from SSF, SIL and equipment type (A/B). 
Ref IEC61508-2 clause 7.4.3.1 and IEC 61511 clause 11.4
Component
OK vs SIL 
requirements
 ?
Yes
No
Figure 6.6: SAR process for proven components which cannot be claimed low complexity.
(Based on OLF, 2004, figure E2)
CHAPTER 6. THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (SAR) PROCESS 64
SRS
Document relevant information
in Safety Analysis Report (SAR)
SAR
Contact SRS owner to evaluate
wether to redesign or apply 
deviationRedesign Deviation
Document proven in use or prior use under avoidance and control of 
systematic failures. Document low complexity under architectural constraints. 
No requirement for documentation of handling of systematic failures, but QA
system must be in place and documented. 
Hardware Requirement
Develop failure rates based on 
FMECA, eld experience, etc. 
Software Requirement
See IEC61508-3 and IEC61511-1 
clause 12 for software 
requirements 
Develop PFD based on test interval in SRS and λDU.  Develop SSF by using 
λDU and λTOTAL. Compare results against SIL requirements in SRS. HFT 
requirement is developed from SSF, SIL and equipment type (A/B). 
Ref IEC61508-2 clause 7.4.3.1 and IEC 61511 clause 11.4
Component
OK vs SIL 
requirements
 ?
Yes
No
Figure 6.7: SAR process for proven technology which is considered low complexity components.
(Based on OLF, 2004, figure E2)
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Example using a hydraulic ASV
An H-ASV is used as an example for proven technology. Such a component is considered low
complexity if it is pure mechanical. This is because the simplicity of the component makes it
possible to foresee any failure mode and behaviour under fault condition. H-ASVs have also
been used for decades and much failure data is thus available. Since many ASVs are small sized
DHSVs, even more reliability data is available. It is thus assumed that an H-ASV in this case will
be both a low complexity and a proven in use or prior use certified component. Figure 6.7 shall
thus be used for the SAR process. If the template in appendix C is used, proven in use or prior use
shall be documented in SAR chapter 14 - Avoidance and control of systematic failures and low
complexity shall be documented in SAR chapter 8 - Architectural constraints. QA systems must
be in place and be documented. Certificates must be included in SAR appendix. See appendix
D for details.
6.4 Comparison of Proven and Non-Proven
Since both the E-ASV (non-proven) and the H-ASV (proven) are considered low complexity sys-
tems, both SARs will be quite similar even if the H-ASV is certified as proven in use or prior use.
Table 6.2 and 6.3 shows the main differences in SAR documentation between the proven and
non-proven technology based on the SAR example in appendix D. In addition high complexity
has been added to the tables to have a wider comparison even though it may be unnecessary to
make a high complexity ASV. The main differences will be between non-proven high complexity
(type B systems) and all other options regardless of non-proven and proven certification.
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Table 6.2: The main differences between non-proven and proven technology during SAR docu-
mentation based on the SAR example in appendix D.
Non-proven Proven
SAR chapter Low complex-
ity
High complex-
ity
Low complex-
ity
High complex-
ity
| Abbreviations - - - -
|| References - - - -
||| Summary - - - -
1 Introduction It will be minor differences between non-proven and proven technol-
ogy. The main differences will be between high and low complexity
components where high complexity has software and maybe diag-
nostics coverage.
2 System descrip-
tion
Minor differences between non-proven and proven. There will be dif-
ferences between high and low complexity systems
3 System topol-
ogy and block
diagrams
Minor differences. The main differences will be related to the com-
plexity of the system and different designs.
4 Operational de-
scription
Minor differences. ASVs only have minor differences in operation but
each vendor has their own way of describing it.
5 Assumptions Minor differences.
6 Failure rate λDD not in-
cluded
λDD maybe in-
cluded
λDD not in-
cluded
λDD maybe in-
cluded
7 Diagnostic cov-
erage
DC normally
not included
DC included if
self testing sys-
tems available
DC normally
not included
DC included if
self testing sys-
tems available
8 Architectural
constraints
Type A subsys-
tem
Type B subsys-
tem
Type A subsys-
tem
Type B subsys-
tem
• SIL when considering HFT and SFF will be different in most cases.
9 Common cause
failures
Similar since both E-ASV and H-ASV has the same block diagram. De-
pendent on the considered system.
10 Behaviour of
system/ compo-
nents on detection
of fault
This will require detailed documentation for high complexity systems.
It is normally sufficient with FMECA in low complexity systems since
it does not include software. For proven in use or prior in use certified
systems, this is normally documented in certification documentation.
11 Mean time to
repair
Leak test of control line not in-
cluded
Leak test of control line in-
cluded
• Minor differences in repair time between ASV designs.
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Table 6.3: The main differences between non-proven and proven technology during SAR docu-
mentation based on the SAR example in appendix D continues.
Non-proven Proven
SAR chapter Low complex-
ity
High complex-
ity
Low complex-
ity
High complex-
ity
12 Factory testing Minor differences. Each vendor has their own FAT practice.
13 Operational
testing
Minor differences. Each vendor has their own test practice.
14 Avoidance and
control of system-
atic failures
Normally only
human errors
documented.
No require-
ment for doc-
umentation
of handling
systematic
failures.
Software and
human error
documenta-
tion. Handling
of system-
atic failures
must also be
included.
No requirement for documen-
tation of handling systematic
failures.
15 Software docu-
mentation
Not included Included Non included Included
16 Results Minor differences
The following conclusions regarding SAR documentation can be drawn from the tables 6.2
and 6.3:
• One should consider to simplify a system until it can be considered low complexity since
this is the only way of reducing documentation for new technology.
• If software is included, the system will be considered high complexity (type B system)
which requires additional documentation.
• If the system is a high complexity (type B) system, one shall consider certifying it as either
proven in use or prior use in order to achieve reduced documentation.
• If software and a diagnostics system is included, the diagnostics coverage must be docu-
mented atleast 60% in order to be used in a SIS.
• An non-proven E-ASV does not necessarily require additional documentation compared
to a proven H-ASV as long as the E-ASV can be considered a low complexity system.
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6.5 Challenges and Potential Improvements
OLF 070 is a guideline made to simplify the IEC61508 and IEC61511 standards. Yet, there are
challenges and room for improvement. Based on the previous sections, challenges regarding
definitions and practical use are found. Improvements are proposed for both IEC and OLF.
6.5.1 Definitions
Some definitions in IEC and OLF are poorly defined. Examples are definitions of "A-type" and
"B-type" systems, proven in use and prior use, etc:
Type A and type B systems: A-type is defined as a subsystem where all possible failure modes
can be determined for all constituent components. B-type is described as subsystems where
behaviour under fault conditions cannot be completely determined for at least one component
(e.g. a logic solver). Reference is made to IEC 61508-2 clause 7.4.
These terms are presented in the IEC standards which OLF 070 refers to. IEC has the respon-
sibility of defining these terms but they do not do this sufficiently. However, OLF is made to
simplify the IEC standards and should clarify these terms so there is no doubt about the mean-
ing.
Common practice is to define systems that contain programmable logic solvers as B-type,
while any other systems which do not include programmable logic solvers are defined as A-type.
This is illustrated in table 6.4 which also is a proposal of improvement to the OLF 070 guideline.
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Table 6.4: Definitions of A-type and B-type subsystems in common practice
Subsystem Description
A-type Subsystems where all possible failure modes can be determined
for all components. Examples are:
• Mechanical components
• Hydraulic components
• Electronics without programmable electronic (PE) compo-
nents
B-type Subsystems where behaviour under fault conditions cannot be
completely determined for at least one component. Examples are:
• Any system which includes PE components
Hardware fault tolerance: Another poorly defined item is the hardware fault tolerance
numbers in table 8.2 and 8.3 in OLF 070 (See table 5.4 and 5.5). Instead of explaining these
numbers, reference is made to IEC 61508-2 clause 7.4. A way of explaining these numbers are
e.g. to define the numbers as HF Ti where i denotes the number. HF Ti +1 = number of faults
that could cause loss of safety function (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2008). E.g. if HF Ti = 0 , one
fault can cause loss of safety function.
IEC terminology: An issue with the IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 standards is that they are of-
ten hard to interpret and understand. An example is the difference between the terms proven in
use and prior use. Exida, which among other services provides certification of SIS components,
(See http://www.exida.com/ for details) has concluded that:
"Both the IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 proven in use requirements lack easy practi-
cal implementation." (Exida, 2004).
It seems like there are two different comities inside the IEC organisation which has defined the
same terminology:
• IEC 61508 use the term proven in use for components which is certified as suitable for its
use
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• IEC 61511 use the term prior use for more or less the same certification
IEC 61511 is the sector specific standard for the process industry and may implement require-
ments from IEC 61508. It seems unnecessary to have two definitions of the same terminology
and it is thus suggested to combine them or define clear differences between them.
It will be easier to use both the IEC standards and the OLF 070 guideline if these descriptions
are properly defined.
6.5.2 Safe Failure Fraction (SFF)
It is sometimes a challenge to fulfil the requirements of SFF in table 8.2 OLF 070 for non-proven
technology such as mechanical safety valves (type A). The SFF is used to determine the number
of redundant components that is needed in order to achieve a given SIL. An increase in redun-
dancy above normal quantity is undesired when developing new technology since one are com-
peting with proven technology. There is often little to none available data for newly developed
components and SFF may be hard to determine. Therefore, one has to assume a value based on
FMECAs, generic data, etc. In many cases, most failure modes are safety critical and SFF (based
on FMECA, etc.) is thereby low (below 60%). If the collected data have insufficient value of safe
failures, it is normal to use the FMECA or vendor experiences to estimate additional safe failures
to achieve SFF above 60%. An example is to add minor hydraulic leakages. This will increase the
total failure rate, but also the SFF. SFF between 60 and 65% is considered a normal value for new
technology. Questions about the SSF value are thereby avoided.
A possible solution is to lower the requirement from <0,6 to e.g. <0,5 for new technology. This
will provide more accurate SSF numbers. If not, the industry is urged to continue to perform
tricks to ensure that the SFF value is kept above 60%.
6.5.3 FMEA
OLF 070 section 8.5.2 describes FMEA as a suitable method when using reliability data from
generic sources (such as the data in OLF 070 Table A1). This may be a source to uncertainties
in practice because generic reliability data (as in OLF 070 Table A1) are average reliability data
based on the same type of equipment but from many different designs and vendors. The reli-
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ability of the newly developed technology will most likely differ from the average reliability of
this equipment. Therefore, in cases when developing new technology, an FMEA alone is a poor
method and should be avoided.
A possible solution is to use generic data from e.g. OREDA in combination with expert judge-
ments to correct the failure data. Based on experience and tests of the new technology, the
generic failure data can be corrected to become more suitable for the actual component or sys-
tem. The comment cell in an FMEA can be used for this purpose where corrections shall be
recommended. One can also add a column for suggested correction.
An FMEA is also often performed in various ways. One expert may split the failure modes
more than other experts do. Differences will appear when calculating reliability data based on
these FMEAs. One is thus able to reduce or increase the reliability of the component based on
how the failure modes are split.
An FMEA is described as mainly a qualitative analysis in Rausand and Høyland (2004) and
other methods should probably be used instead. A better method has however, not been found
due to the time limit and that other objectives have been prioritized. This can thus be regarded
as remaining work.
Chapter 7
PFD Calculations
This chapter provides PFD calculations for all four configurations options provided in chapter
3. These calculations are used for providing an overall assessment of the safety function config-
urations. The method used to perform PFD calculations is Fault Tree Analysis (FTA).
7.1 Definition of Critical Event
The critical event in these cases is lift gas release to the environment from lower A-annulus
reservoir in offshore topside oil production wells that utilizes gas lift. This is because the lower
A-annulus has the biggest volume compared with the upper A-annulus and thus contains most
of the lift gas (see section 7.2 for details).
7.2 Boundary Conditions
The task is limited to lift gas release from A- annulus reservoir. Blowout from reservoir is not
taken into account. Neither are leakage to / from B-annulus and C-annulus.
Annulus reservoir is split by the ASV. Most of annulus reservoir is contained in the volume
below the ASV (lower A-annulus). A smaller volume of lift gas is also kept in the volume above
the ASV (upper A-annulus). This is illustrated in figure 7.1. Leakage through B and C annu-
lus and through completion string is not included in these analyses. This leaves us with the
ASV assembly, which represent the primary barrier, and AMV, M-SAS, tubing hanger, AAV, blind
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flanges, etc. representing the secondary barrier. There are thus two leakage scenarios:
1. Leakage from lower A-annulus via upper A-annulus: Leakage from lower A-annulus through
ASV assembly via upper A-annulus. From upper A-annulus to the environment through
one of the secondary barrier elements.
2. Leakage from upper A-annulus only: Leakage from upper A-annulus to the environment
through one of the secondary barrier elements.
The analyses are limited to the first leakage scenario since most of the lift gas volume is con-
tained inside the lower A-annulus. Some of the configuration options (option 2 and 4) do not
include ASV and TOP event is thus gas release from annulus reservoir (both upper and lower
A-annulus).
Upper A-annulus
(3-5m3 of lift gas)
Lower A-annulus
(10-150m3 of lift gas)
Figure 7.1: Upper and lower A-annulus volumes (Values are provided by ExproSoft AS).
The PFD calculations are performed using the A-annulus components which are needed to
contain the A-annulus reservoir. Relevant components are:
• ASV packer
• ASV
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• AAV
• AMV
• AWV
• M-SAS valve
• Blind flanges
• Pressure monitoring (monitoring)
• Tubing hanger
• WH connector
• Flow and gas lines (pipes)
It is assumed that the components are independent. To simplify the task and to reduce work,
leak rates are not divided into levels in this study as it normally is in analysis performed by
professionals. Note that some of the reliability data are provided from a database using specific
filters for specific applications. These reliability data can thus not be used in other applications.
7.2.1 Scenarios
The FTAs are based on the gray area in the well barrier diagrams in chapter 3. Items outside that
gray area are not taken into account. Two of the configurations in chapter 3 (option 1 and option
2) would have been almost identical if initial barriers was used in the PFD calculations. To get
a wider variety in scenarios, the system PFD in option 2 (AMV after ASV failure) is calculated
after failure of ASV, before M-SAS is inserted instead of ASV and AMV as in option 1. Note that
since option 2 initially includes a spool flange for the M-SAS valve, M-SAS external leak has been
added as a fault event.
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7.3 Reliability Data
This section provides reliability data for each component in the FTAs. Reliability data are found
in OREDA, OLF 070, PDS and Wellmaster Phase 5. Note that filter searches are performed for
some of the data which means that the data cannot be used in other applications. Assumptions
are also made for some of the components and suggested failure rates may differ from failure
rates found in the databases. Note that repair times and test interval have been provided by
ExproSoft AS.
The failure rate λ is calculated by equation (7.1) (Based on Rausand and Høyland, 2004,
equation 2.38).
λ= No.of failures
Aggregated time in service
= n
t
(7.1)
7.3.1 Gate Valves
Relevant gate valve failure modes in this study are: External leakage (EXL), Leakage in closed
position (LCP) and Fail to close (FTC). LCP and FTC represent internal leakage (ITL). OREDA
provides reliability data for gate valves. These are presented in table 7.1 and have a total time in
service of 3 852 300 valve hours or 439,8 valve years.
Table 7.1: Reliability data for gate valves (ore, 2002)
Severity class Failure mode No. of failures
critical External leak process medium 1
critical Fail to close on demand 34
critical Valve leakage in closed position 2
degraded External leak process medium 8
degraded External leak utility medium 6
degraded Valve leakage in closed position 20
Total 71
Table 7.2 shows the failure modes and calculated failure rates from the gate valve reliability
data table (table 7.1) using formula (7.1). These values are suggested to be used for relevant
failure modes in the analyses.
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Table 7.2: Failure modes and corresponding failure rates calculated using equation (7.1) and
table 7.1.
Failure data source Failure mode Failure rate (λ) (per 106 hours)
OREDA EXL 3,890
OREDA FTC 8,830
OREDA LCP 5,710
7.3.2 ASV
The ASV reliability data is based on WellMaster phase 5 which is provided by ExproSoft AS. A
specific filter (not for general use) is used but the suggested EXL failure rate is based on table
7.2. The relevant failure modes are EXL, LCP and FTC. ASV ITL is represented by FTC and LCP
together. It is assumed that EXL for ASV can be represented by 3% of the EXL for gate valves
provided by OREDA. This is because it is assumed that it is a lower probability of EXL than ITL.
The relevant failure modes with corresponding failure rates are given in table 7.3.
Table 7.3: Failure modes and corresponding failure rates of ASV
Failure mode Failure rate (λ)
(per 106 hours)
Failure rate source Failure ob-
servation
Test inter-
val
Repair
time
FTC 0,278 WellMaster Phase 5 Testing 6 months 28 days
LCP 0,209 WellMaster Phase 5 Testing 6 months 28 days
FTC + LCP 0,487 WellMaster Phase 5 Testing 6 months 28 days
EXL 0,117 OREDA Testing 6 months 28 days
7.3.3 AAV
The AAV is considered to have a ITL failure rate which is a bit better than the ASV since the flow
through the AAV is less than flow through ASVs. It is thus suggested to use an ITL failure rate of
50% of ASV failure rate. EXL is assumed to be the same for both valves. The suggested failure
rates for AAV is presented in table 7.4.
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Table 7.4: Suggested failure rates for AAV
Failure mode Failure rate (λ)
(per 106 hours)
Failure rate source Failure ob-
servation
Test inter-
val
Repair
time
ITL 0,244 WellMaster Phase 5 When occur-
ring
NA 28 days
EXL 0,117 OREDA Testing NA 28 days
7.3.4 AMV and AWV
AMV and AWV failure rates are based on OREDA reliability data for gate valves (section 7.3.1). It
is assumed that 2% of all EXL for gate valves are related to AMV and AWV. It is also assumed that
10% of gate valve FTC and LCP are related to AMV and AWV. The failure rates are presented in
table 7.5. ITL is represented by LCP and FTC together.
Table 7.5: Failure modes and corresponding failure rates of AMV
Failure mode Failure rate (λ)
(per 106 hours)
Failure rate source Failure ob-
servation
Test inter-
val
Repair
time
EXL 0,0778 OREDA Testing 1 year 1 day
LCP + FTC 1,454 OREDA Testing 1 year 1 day
7.3.5 M-SAS Valves
Data for the M-SAS valves has been found in WellMaster. Relevant failure modes are LCP and
FTC. In addition, EXL for gate valves is used. It is assumed that EXL for M-SAS valves is the same
as for AMVs and AWV. This is presented in table 7.6. ITL is represented by LCP and FTC together.
Table 7.6: Failure modes and corresponding failure rates of M-SAS valves
Failure mode Failure rate (λ)
(per 106 hours)
Failure rate source Failure ob-
servation
Test inter-
val
Repair
time
EXL 0,0778 OREDA Testing 1 year 7 days
LCP 0,22 WellMaster Testing 1 year 7 days
FTC 1,98 WellMaster Testing 1 year 7 days
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7.3.6 ASV Packers
The reliability data for the ASV packer is taken from WellMaster 5. The relevant failure modes are
leakage across packer (LAP) and premature release (PRL). Only LAP was found for ASV packers.
The reliability data are shown in table 7.7
Table 7.7: Failure modes and corresponding failure rates for dual string ASV packers.
Failure
mode
Failure rate (λ)
(per 106 hours)
Failure rate source Failure ob-
servation
Test inter-
val
Repair
time
LAP 0,374 WellMaster Phase 5 When occur-
ring
6 months 28 days
7.3.7 Blind Flange and Spool Flange
There are little relevant reliability data available regarding blind flanges. The majority of such
leaks are small and associated with start up. It is thus assumed that leakage from blind flanges
and spool flanges can be represented by 2,5% of the EXL failure mode provided by OREDA. Sug-
gested failure rate for use in the FTA is presented in table 7.8
Table 7.8: Suggested failure rate of blind flanges and spool flanges
Failure mode Failure rate (λ)
(per 106 hours)
Failure rate source Failure ob-
servation
Test inter-
val
Repair
time
Leakage 0,0973 WellMaster Phase 5 Testing 1 year 1 day
7.3.8 Pressure Monitoring
According to the PDS handbook, pressure transmitters have a mean dangerous undetected fail-
ure rate of 0,3 per 1006 hours (see Hauge and Onshus (2010)). But this is electrical equipment
which provides input to a logic solver. In this case, we are looking for reliability data of also
manual/analogue equipment. It is thus suggested to use 30% of the leak probability in PDS
handbook. This i presented in table 7.9.
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Table 7.9: Suggested failure rate of pressure monitoring
Failure mode Failure rate (λ)
(per 106 hours)
Failure rate source Failure ob-
servation
Test inter-
val
Repair
time
Leakage 0,1 PDS Handbook When occur-
ring
NA 1 day
7.3.9 Tubing and Casing Hanger Seals
The relevant failure modes for tubing and casing hanger in this analysis are tubing to annulus
communication (TAC) and other (OTH). WellMaster Phase 5 using a specific filter search (not
for general use) is used to provide reliability data. This is shown in table 7.10.
Table 7.10: Suggested failure rates of Tubing and casing hangers
Failure mode Failure rate (λ)
(per 106 hours)
Failure rate source Failure ob-
servation
Test inter-
val
Repair
time
TAC + OTH 0,135 WellMaster Phase 5 Testing 1 year 28 days
7.3.10 Flow and Gas Lift Line (Pipes)
It is likely that leakage through flow and gas lift lines will be different from well to well because
each well has differences in line length, type of valves, number of valves, etc. It is thus hard to
come up with a representative value. Based on a filter search in WellMaster Phase 5, a failure
rate is suggested. This is presented in table 7.11.
Table 7.11: Suggested failure rates of flow and gas lift lines
Failure mode Failure rate (λ)
(per 106 hours)
Failure rate source Failure ob-
servation
Test inter-
val
Repair
time
Leakage 0,300 WellMaster Phase 5 when occur-
ring
NA 1 day
7.3.11 Wellhead Connector
OREDA (ore (2002)) has been used as a source for reliability data for WH connectors. Relevant
failure mode is External leakage - process medium (ELP). OREDA does not provide detailed re-
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liability data and mean failure rate has thus been used. Repair time is provided by Exprosoft.
Suggested reliability data is presented in table 7.12.
Table 7.12: Suggested failure rates for wellhead connectors (ore (2002))
Failure mode Failure rate (λ)
(per 106 hours)
Failure rate source Failure ob-
servation
Test inter-
val
Repair
time
ELP 0,0857 OREDA Testing 1 year 7 days
7.4 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
A fault tree is a logic diagram that displays the connections between a potential system failure
(TOP event) and the causes (Basic events) for the failure. FTAs are conducted for the four con-
figuration options shown in chapter 3. This is done to calculate the PFD and thereby do an over-
all assessment of the configurations based on the results. According to Rausand and Høyland
(2004), a fault tree is carried out by the following five steps:
1. Definition of problem and boundary conditions
2. Construction of the fault tree
3. Identification of minimal cut sets (described further in section 7.4.3
4. Quantitative analysis of the fault tree
5. Qualitative analysis of the fault tree
Step 1 is done in section 7.1 and 7.2. Step 2 is presented in appendix E by utilizing the CARA
Fault Tree software. Step 3 - 5 are performed by the software using the reliability data provided
in section 7.3. The cut sets are listed in appendix E.3 and the result is presented in section 7.5
along with an overall assessment of the configurations.
7.4.1 Symbols
Table 7.13 lists and describes the symbols used in the FTAs.
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Table 7.13: Fault tree symbols (Rausand and Høyland, 2004)
Type Symbol Description
Logic gates OR-Gate
A
E1 E3E2
The OR-gate indicates that the output event
A occurs if any of the input events Ei occur.
And-Gate
A
E1 E3E2
The AND-gate indicates that the output
event A occurs only when all the input
events Ei occur simultaneously.
Input events Basic event The basic event represents a basic equip-
ment fault or failure that requires no further
development into more basic faults or fail-
ures.
Undeveloped event The undeveloped event represents an event
that is not examined further because infor-
mation is unavailable or because of insignif-
icant consequences.
Description Comment rectangle The comment rectangle is for supplemen-
tary information.
Transfer symbols Transfer out The transfer out symbol indicates that the
fault tree is developed further at the occur-
rence of the corresponding transfer in sym-
bol.
Transfer in
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7.4.2 Basic Events
According to the CARA Fault Tree software, there are four types of basic events which can be
used in the FTA:
• Test interval
• Repairable
• Non-repairable
• On demand
All basic events in this thesis are of either test interval or repairable basic events since both
test intervals and repair times are available or assumed for most components. Some of the com-
ponents such as AAV, pressure monitoring equipment, and the gas and flow lines are not tested
regularly. Since test interval is not available for these components, they are assumed repairable.
Information about the relevant basic events are provided by ExproSoft AS and listed below:
Test Interval
Test interval is used to describe components that are tested periodically with test interval t . A
failure may occur anywhere in the test interval. The failure will, however, not be detected until
the component is needed or the test is carried out. The failure rateλ (expected number of critical
failures per hour), the test interval t (in hours) and the repair time τ (in hours) are the entered
reliability parameters. CARA Fault Tree calculates the PFD by the formula (7.2).
qi (t )≈ λt
2
+λτ (7.2)
Note that formula (7.2) is only valid if independent testing of each component is performed.
Therefore, this formula will not be correct if components are tested simultaneously or if stag-
gered testing is done. The result will then be too optimistic. Since the test-interval and time
of tests generally are known parameters and not independent, this restriction in the program is
compensated for by re-defining the tested barriers as repairable items with an increased critical
repair time of half the test interval (shown in formula (7.3)).
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qi (t )≈
t
2 +MT T R
t
2 +MT T R+MT T F
(7.3)
The mean safety critical downtime will in this case be the sum of half of the test interval and
mean time to repair (MT T R).
Repairable
Repairable is used for components that are repaired when failure occurs. The components are
tested periodically with the test interval t (in hours). A failure may occur anywhere in the test
interval. The failure will, however, not be detected until the test is carried out or the component
is needed. The probability qi (t ) is in this situation often referred to as the PFD or unavailability.
The failure rate (λ) is the expected number of critical failures per hour. The mean time to repair
(MTTR) is denoted τ (in hours). MTTR is also the mean repair time. qi (t ) may be calculated by
the formula (7.4).
qi (t )= λτ
1+λτ (1−e
1− (1+λτ)tτ ) (7.4)
By letting t tend to infinity, we obtain the well-known approximation which is shown in equation
(7.5).
qi (t )= MTTR
MTTR+MTTF (7.5)
where
MTTF= 1
λ
The reliability parameters entered to the CARA software are λ (expected number of failures per
hour) and MTTR (in hours).
7.4.3 Cut Set
A combination of fault events that will lead to a TOP event is called a cut set. In FTAs, a cut set is
defined as:
"...a set of basic events whose occurrence (at the same time) ensures that the TOP
event occurs." (Rausand and Høyland, 2004).
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The CARA Fault Tree software can analyse and present the cut sets in fault trees. However,
the cut sets presented are called minimal cut sets. A minimal cut set is defined as a cut set that
cannot be reduced without losing its status as a cut set. The order of the cut set is defined as the
number of the basic events in a minimal cut set.
In small fault trees, it is possible to identify the minimal cut sets by inspection. In larger
fault trees, this is not possible without an efficient algorithm (see Rausand and Høyland, 2004,
section 3.6.4).
7.4.4 Upper Bound Approximation
The CARA Fault Tree software uses upper bound approximation to calculate the unavailability of
the system (TOP event). Upper bound approximation is considered to be a conservative method
since it uses the minimal cut sets of the fault tree to calculate unavailability. If the basic events
are assumed to be independent, the upper bound approximation can be expressed by the for-
mula (7.6) (See Rausand and Høyland, 2004, equation 4.47), where qi (t ) denote the probability
that basic event i occurs at time t and
∨
Q j (t ) denote the probability that minimal cut set j fails
at time t .
∨
Q j (t )=
∏
i∈K j
qi (t ) (7.6)
The CARA Fault Thee software uses another formula which is used when all the qi (t )s are small.
This is formula (7.7). Note that Q0(t ) denote the system failure.
Q0(t )≈ 1−
k∏
j=1
(1− ∨Q j (t )) (7.7)
Formula 7.7 has to be used with care when atleast one of the qi (t )s is of order 10−2 or larger
(Rausand and Høyland (2004)).
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7.5 Overall Assessment of Safety Function Configurations
The fault trees in appendix E are used to quantify the probability of lift gas release from annulus
reservoir for all configurations options in chapter 3. Limitations are listed in section 7.2. Option
1, which is the conventional annulus safety configuration using ASV and AMV as barrier ele-
ments, is used as base case. This means that the other configurations are compared to option 1.
The various configurations are listed in table 7.14.
Table 7.14: List of the various configuration options
Option: Components: Description:
1 (Base case) ASV + AMV Initial barrier elements
2 AMV After ASV failure before M-SAS is inserted
3 ASV + AMV + M-SAS Initial barrier elements
4 AMV + M-SAS Initial barrier elements
7.5.1 FTA Results
The result from the FTAs are presented in table 7.15 and in figure 7.2, and act as a base line for
further analyses. Note that logarithmic scale is used in figure 7.2.
Table 7.15: Overall assessment of the safety configurations (Base line)
Well design PFD Relative base case Relative option 2
Option 1: ASV + AMV (Base case) 2,40E−06 1,00
Option 2: AMV after ASV failure 8,52E−04 355,32 1,00
Option 3: ASV + AMV + M-SAS 1,45E−06 0,60
Option 4: AMV + M-SAS 5,17E−04 215,44 0,61
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Figure 7.2: The result of the PFD calculations for each option (Base line)
The result shows that the configuration, which includes three barriers (option 3), is the most
reliable. The second most reliable configurations are the ones that include two barriers (option
1 and 4). The option that only includes one barrier has the poorest reliability (option 2). This
was as expected.
The result also shows that the configurations using M-SAS valves (option 3 and 4) are slightly
more reliable than the configurations without (option 1 and 2). This indicates that the M-SAS
valve does not contribute significantly to the reliability of the system. When comparing option
2 (AMV) with option 1 (ASV + AMV) and option 4 (AMV + M-SAS) the result shows minor dif-
ferences between option 2 and 4 compared to option 2 and 1. This is another indication of low
system reliability contribution for the M-SAS valve.
The low system reliability contribution is hard to believe since configurations that utilize M-
SAS valves are approved by OLF as alternative to ASV configurations. Further investigation is
thus performed (see subsection 7.5.2).
If the result in figure 7.2 and table 7.15 is final, the following recommendations can be drawn
from the result:
• All configuration options except for option 4 are recommended to be used in offshore top-
side gas lift applications. Note that option 2 initially includes an ASV and can therefore be
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recommended. Option 4 is not recommended since it represents almost the same system
PFD as option 2 (AMV after ASV failure).
• An configuration using only AMV as barrier element (represented by option 2) should be
avoided because of high system PFD compared to option 1 and 3.
• ASVs are preferred before M-SAS valves
7.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
The result (base line) showed a low system reliability contribution from the M-SAS valve. This is
hard to believe due to approval of the configuration from OLF. Sensitivity analyses are conducted
for further investigation:
A series of assumptions was made when developing reliability data and this can be a source
to uncertainties. A sensitivity analysis is conducted for M-SAS valves, AMV and ASV for base line
to compare the criticality of the barrier elements. This is presented in table 7.16.
Table 7.16: System PFD when using different failure rates for M-SAS, AMV and ASV
2 ·M-SAS failure rate 20 ·M-SAS failure rate
Option: PFD Relative base line PFD Relative base line
1 ASV + AMV 2,40E−06 1,00 2,40E−06 1,00
2 AMV 4,69E−03 5,51 4,70E−03 5,51
3 ASV + AMV + M-SAS 1,48E−06 1,03 5,03E−06 3,48
4 AMV + M-SAS 5,30E−04 1,03 1,80E−03 3,48
2 · AMV failure rate 20 · AMV failure rate
Option: PFD Relative base line PFD Relative base line
1 ASV + AMV 3,37E−06 1,41 2,08E−05 8,66
2 AMV 1,19E−03 1,40 7,33E−03 8,60
3 ASV + AMV + M-SAS 1,45E−06 1,01 1,63E−06 1,13
4 AMV + M-SAS 5,20E−04 1,01 5,82E−04 1,13
2 · ASV failure rate 20 · ASV failure rate
Option: PFD Relative base line PFD Relative base line
1 ASV + AMV 4,79E−06 2,00 4,74E−05 19,78
2 AMV 8,52−04 1,00 8,52E−04 1,00
3 ASV + AMV + M-SAS 2,89E−06 2,00 2,86E−05 19,78
4 AMV + M-SAS 5,17E−04 1,00 5,17E−04 1,00
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Table 7.16 shows that the ASV contribute much more to the system reliability than the M-SAS
valve and the AMV. If the failure rate of the ASV is doubled, the system PFD is doubled, and if the
failure rate of the ASV is multiplied with 20, the system PFD is multiplied with almost 20. The M-
SAS valve and AMV makes minor changes to the system PFD when the failure rates are changed.
A higher system PFD contribution is expected from the M-SAS valve since it is recommended
as an alternative configuration to the conventional configuration (option 1). The reason for the
result may be that the M-SAS valve is located on the same branch as the AMV in the fault trees.
There are also alternative leakage paths (through the tubing hanger or via AAV) to the leakage
path through the M-SAS valve. It is suspected that the alternative leakage paths contribute so
much to the system PFD that changes in M-SAS valve failure rate, only brings minor changes to
system PFD.
7.5.3 Suggested System Improvements
It is expected to be more similarity between the options using two barrier elements (option 1
and 4). Two reasons are suspected to be the cause of the unexpected result.
• There are errors (either in the fault trees or in the failure rates used).
• The M-SAS valve does not contribute significantly due to low reliability in a nearby fault
tree branch.
The cut sets for each tree (listed in appendix E) indicate that the open AAV can be a source to
the low contribution of system reliability by the M-SAS valve. This is because the AAV is included
in many of the lowest order minimal cut sets. By looking at the well barrier schematics in chapter
3 or the fault trees in appendix E, one can see that the path through the AAV has only one barrier
in addition to the primary, while the others have two.
M-SAS Valve as AAV
The AAV is a manual valve which is kept open all the time except for when the blind flange or
pressure monitoring is replaced. It has to be kept open in order to monitor the annulus pressure.
A solution can be to close the AAV when a demand occurs in order to increase the system reli-
ability. This may be hard to do in practice since the AAV is manual. It is thus instead suggested
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to use an M-SAS valve as an AAV. The additional M-SAS valve can be connected to the SIS and
automatically close on demand. New fault trees are developed (see appendix E.4) and the result
is presented in table 7.17 and in figure 7.3. Note that logarithmic scale is used in figure 7.3.
Table 7.17: Overall assessment of the safety configurations when M-SAS valve is used as AAV
Well design PFD Relative base case Relative option 2
Option 1: ASV + AMV (Base case) 9,95E−07 1,00
Option 2: AMV after ASV failure 7,09E−04 712,97 1,00
Option 3: ASV + AMV + M-SAS 4,21E−08 0,04
Option 4: AMV + M-SAS 1,50E−05 15,12 0,02
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Figure 7.3: The result of the PFD calculations for each option when M-SAS valve is used as AAV
The result shows a significant improvement compared to base line: If option 2 (AMV after
ASV failure) is compared to option 4 (AMV + M-SAS), option 2 is almost 50 times worse than op-
tion 4. Option 1 and 4 has become more similar as well. The results are good, but the suggested
improvement can probably not be used in practise since the pressure monitoring has to be used
all the time. If the suggested improvement was used regardless of the pressure monitoring, the
following recommendations can be drawn from the results:
• All four configuration options (represented by option 1, 3 and 4) are recommended to be
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used in offshore topside gas lift applications. Note that option 2 initially includes an ASV
and can therefore be recommended.
• A configuration using only AMV as barrier element (represented by option 2) should be
avoided because of high system PFD compared to the other configuration options.
• Option 4 provides high system availability compared to option 2 and is considered an
alternative to option 1 if 15,12 times higher unavailability is sufficient.
• Option 3 will improve system availability compared to the conventional configuration
(option 1).
• Option 2, 3 and 4 provides advantages such as reduced risk, cost and time-consumption
(see chapter 3 for details) when performing maintenance since the M-SAS valve is used.
Improvement of Failure Rates
The small system PFD contribution of the M-SAS valve can probably be caused by the small dif-
ferences in reliability between the basic events in the "Release via AAV" fault tree branch (Blind
flange, pressure monitoring and AAV external leak) and the other components (M-SAS, AMV,
ASV, etc.). This leaves us with three options:
1. Change failure rates Prove either lower failure rate on blind flange, pressure monitoring
and AAV, or higher failure rate on the other components in the tree.
2. Change the system Change the system by adding or reducing components. The highest
effect in this option will probably be to include an and-gate in the "Release via AAV" fault
tree branch so the failure rates below will be multiplied with each other (This is done when
an M-SAS is used as AAV).
3. A combination of the above
A change in the basic event failure rates in the "Release via AAV" fault tree branch is done since
the second option is already tried. The failure rates of AAV external leak, blind flange and pres-
sure monitoring are multiplied with 0,1. The result is presented in table 7.18 and in figure 7.4.
Note that logarithmic scale is used in figure 7.4.
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Table 7.18: Overall assessment of the safety configurations when failure rates of AAV external
leak, blind flange and pressure monitoring are multiplied with 0,1
Well design PFD Relative base case Relative option 2
Option 1: ASV + AMV (Base case) 1,11E−06 1,00
Option 2: AMV after ASV failure 3,94E−04 355,21 1,00
Option 3: ASV + AMV + M-SAS 1,63E−07 0,15
Option 4: AMV + M-SAS 5,82E−05 52,47 0,15
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Figure 7.4: The result of the PFD calculations for each option when failure rates of AAV external
leak, blind flange and pressure monitoring are multiplied with 0,1
The result is not as good as the result when using M-SAS as an AAV, but it improved the
system PFD contribution of M-SAS valve compared to base line for option 4. It will however be
hard to prove lower failure rates than done in this case and this is thus not suggested as a good
solution to the problem. This problem has not been investigated further due to lack of time and
higher priority of other topics. It can thus be regarded as remaining work.
Chapter 8
Summary and Recommendations for
Further Work
This final chapter sums up what is done and what the result shows. The result is discussed and
recommendations for future work are given.
8.1 Summary and Conclusions
The overall objective was to describe the steps components need to go through in order to be a
part of a safety function. All the objectives stated in section 1.2 are more or less answered.
Basic information about relevant well type, well equipments, gas lift and well barriers is pro-
vided in chapter 2. Special requirements are provided for some of the WBEs in this chapter.
Four annulus barrier configurations for gas lift systems are found and described in chapter
3. Their maintenance strategies are briefly described and general advantages and disadvantages
are listed. Well barrier diagrams and well barrier schematics are also provided for each configu-
ration. The well barrier diagrams are used in the PFD calculations in chapter 7.
Important terms regarding annular safety are briefly explained in chapter 4. This includes
safety instrumented system (SIS) and safety instrumented function (SIF). An example is used to
illustrate the relation between these terms and annulus safety.
Requirements regarding annulus safety systems are provided in chapter 5. This chapter
starts off with governing regulations regarding barriers in both Norway and the United States
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of America. The main difference between these governing regulations is that Norway requires
two WBEs in annulus, while USA requires only one. Norwegian requirements open up for alter-
native configurations to the conventional one if acceptable risk and safety can be documented.
Requirements regarding SIS for annulus well barriers in Norway follow. According to OLF, there
are three main requirements that need to be fulfilled in order to achieve a given SIL. Required
documentation for SIS components is described. This includes the SRS and the SAR. The SAR
content varies from whether the component is proven or non-proven. Recommendations for
SIS project phases and information regarding responsibility according to OLF are also provided
in this chapter.
Descriptions of the safety analysis report (SAR) processes are provided both for non-proven
and proven technology in chapter 6. This is also the third objective. This is done by making
flowcharts based on the OLF 070 guideline. A hydraulically operated ASV is used as proven
technology and an electrically operated ASV is used as non-proven technology. SAR examples
for proven and non-proven technology are made and used for comparison. Challenges regard-
ing the SAR process are pointed out and discussed. Potential improvements to the OLF 070
guideline and to the IEC standards are also proposed. Examples are poor definitions of terms
and practical problems regarding SFF and methods for acquiring reliability data.
PFD calculations for the safety configuration options are performed in chapter 7. These are
provided by using reliability data found in OREDA, WellMaster and other databases, and the
well barrier schematics and diagrams given in chapter 3. The PFD calculations were performed
using the CARA fault three analysis software.
An overall assessment of the safety function configurations is performed in chapter 7. This is
done based on the PFD calculation results. The result was unexpected and shows that only three
of the options can be recommended. The result indicates poor reliability for the alternative
configuration compared to the conventional. This was also unexpected since the alternative
configuration is recommended by OLF 070. Another unexpected feature with the result is that
the option with three barrier elements has slightly better reliability than the most used gas lift
configuration which only includes two barriers. A significant difference is expected here.
Sensitivity analyses was conducted and showed low system reliability contribution of the M-
SAS valve. The blind flange, pressure monitoring and AAV are reviled as system weaknesses. An
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improvement is proposed involving replacing the AAV with an M-SAS valve to improve the sec-
ondary barrier. The suggested improvement proves increased system reliability which results in
recommendation of all four configurations options. A specified configuration is recommended
not to be used. However, the suggested improvement may not be used in practise due to block-
ing of a monitoring device. Another improvement is suggested and analysed. This involves
improving the components that is included in the weak part of the system. The suggested im-
provement shows minor changes in system PFD compared to the first suggestion and is thus
discarded.
8.2 Discussion
In chapter 3 the various gas lift configuration options are listed. In option 2 and 3, ASV retrieval
(workover) may be required regardless if the ASV is stuck in closed position. If this happens, the
whole intention with the M-SAS valve will be wasted since the main advantage is to do a light
intervention (inserting the M-SAS valve) and thus avoid risky and time-consuming workover.
It is, however, possible to force the ASV open by pumping gas down towards the flapper or by
lowering a pipe down to the flapper and thereby push it open. The SIS will be functioning as
long as the A-annulus can be closed by the M-SAS and AMV. Gas lift during production will also
be possible as long as the ASV is kept open.
Whether or not the ASV has to be retrieved if it is stuck in closed position, has not been
investigated any further due to limited time. This can thus be added to remaining work. The
possibility of having the ASV stuck in closed position is most likely very small. Such an event
can be caused by control line leakage or severe mechanical damage. The latter may result in a
mandatory retrieval of the ASV if the ASV is not possible to force open.
The PFD calculations were performed by making fault trees in the CARA fault tree analysis
software. The result shows small improvements to the system when the M-SAS valve is used.
There are also major differences when ASV and AMV (option 1) is used compared to when an
AMV and an M-SAS (option 4) is used. A low contribution to the system PFD is found for the M-
SAS valve. The improvements proposed helped but was disregarded due to practical problems.
Other suggestions such as larger changes in the system are not investigated any further due to
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lack of time.
The reason for the result can be related to lack of experience if the fault trees include errors.
The system could have been misunderstood and thereby caused faulty fault trees. It is possible
that an expert would have done the FTAs differently. However, experts had a look at the fault
trees and provided tips, but without major improvements.
The reliability data which was used in the FTAs may be a source of uncertainty and can also
be the reason for the problem. These were mainly found in old OREDA versions and in WellMas-
ter Phase 5. Newer versions of these databases are available but were not used due to restricted
access. Different results may have been obtained if these newer databases were used.
Some of the reliability data were assumed due to lack of relevant data. These data may be
available elsewhere and could have changed the result. If errors in reliability data are the cause
to the problem, the result in chapter 7 is a good example of why quality assurance of the relia-
bility data is important.
8.3 Recommendations for Further Work
This thesis was carried out within a limited period of time and it is recommended that the find-
ings are explored further. Remaining work are mainly PFD calculations and overall assessment
of the configurations. There are also more challenges and potential improvements that can be
done in OLF 070.
PFD Calculations
The PFD calculations performed in chapter 7 are based on databases such as OREDA and Well-
Master. These are old databases and newer reliability data would be better to use and would
probably enhance the result. Some of the reliability data used was assumed since no data was
available. This may be obtained if more time and other databases were available. The fault trees
may also be a source to uncertainties since they have been performed by a student.
The task is also limited to gas release from annulus reservoir. This could be extended to
include blowout from reservoir. More components must then be included and the analysis will
be more extensive. Problems regarding the PFD calculation can be regarded as anywhere from
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short to long term work classification.
Improvements to the System
Work can be done in order to improve the annulus safety systems, especially if the fault trees
in chapter 7 are found without errors. Good improvements may require a lot of work but sug-
gestions may not. Further work regarding system improvement is considered short to medium
term work classification.
Challenges and Improvements of OLF 070
Only a few challenges related to OLF 070, IEC and the safety analysis report (SAR) process were
pointed out due to limited time and lack of experience. More potential improvements to the
OLF 070 can be found if one or several more experienced person(s) are available. Interviews
with experienced persons can be arranged to obtain more proposals of improvements to the
OLF 070 guideline. One can also study IEC and OLF further to acquire the knowledge needed.
Working with these standards is difficult and requires a lot of time. This work is thus considered
as long term work.
Improving OLF and IEC
The challenges and improvements regarding OLF and IEC presented in this thesis can be devel-
oped further. Clear definitions of the various terms shall be defined and there are many which
are interested in simplified standards. More knowledge and experience are then required. This
is considered short to long term work, dependent on how much improvement that should be
done.
Failure Rates for New Technology
Alternative ways of developing failure rates for new technology can be suggested. FMEA, FMEDA,
expert judgements and other methods can be investigated in order to find the best method. This
will require knowledge about the various methods available today. This is considered medium
to long term work classification.
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Retrieval of ASV in M-SAS Configurations
Potential future work is to investigate the likelihood of a mandatory retrieval of the ASV in con-
figurations that utilizes M-SAS valves. This is also discussed in section 8.2. If the likelihood of
having the ASV stuck in closed position is high, the M-SAS configurations may not be recom-
mended regardless of system reliability. This is considered short term work.
Appendix A
Acronyms
AAV Annulus access valve
AMV Annulus master valve
API American Petroleum Institute
ASV Annulus safety valve
AWV Annulus wing valve
BSEE Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement
BOP Blowout preventer
DHSV Downhole safety valve
E-ASV Electrically operated annulus safety valve
E-DHSV Electric operated downhole safety valve
E/E/PE Electric/Electronic/Programmable Electronic
ELP External leakage - process medium
ESD Emergency shutdown
ESP Electronic submersible pump
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EUC Equipment under control
EXL External leakage
FMEA Failure mode and effect analysis
FMECA Failure mode, effect and criticality analysis
FTA Fault Tree Analysis
FTC Fail to close
FSN Fail to set in nipple
FSV Flow safety valve
FTA Fault tree analysis
FTC Fail to close on command
GLV Gas-lift valve
H-ASV Hydraulically operated annulus safety valve
HAZOP Hazard and operability study
HFT Hardware fault tolerance
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
ITL Internal leakage
KV Kill valve
LAP Leakage across packer
LCP Leakage in closed position
M-SAS Modular surface annular safety
OLF Oljeindustriens Landsforening
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OREDA Offshore Reliability Data
OTH Other
PFD Probability of failure on demand
PMV Production mater valve
P & ID Piping and identification
PE Programmable Electronic
PSA Petroleum Safety Authority Norway
PSV Production swab valve
PTC Petroleum Technology Company
PWV Production wing valve
QA Quality assurance
QRA Quantitative risk assessment
SAR Safety analysis report
SCSSV Surface-controlled subsurface safety valve
SIF Safety instrumented function
SIL Safety integrity level
SIS Safety instrumented system
SPM Side pocket mandrel
SRS Safety requirement specification
SSF Safe failure fraction
TAC Tubing to annulus communication
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TR Tubing retrievable
USA The United States of America
VR Valve removal
WBE Well barrier element
WH Wellhead
WP Working pressure
MEDP Maximum expected differential pressure
XMT X-mas tree or production tree
Appendix B
Detailed SRS Content
This is a detailed description of the SRS content (adopted from ConocoPhillips, 2013a, table
1-2).
ID Reference to IEC 61511, Chapter 10.3 Comments SRS version
1 A description of all the safety instrumented
functions necessary to achieve the required
functional safety
Identified safety functions are
listed in SIL identification and
allocation report /6/. Detailed
description of each function is
described in the system SRSs.
Version 1
2 Requirements to identify and take account
of common mode failures
General description in OLF 070
to be used generally in all SRS’S
Version 2
3 A definition of the safe state of the pro-
cess for each identified safety instrumented
function
Evaluated in SIL identification
and allocation report /6/. Fur-
ther details in system SRS.
Version 1
4 A definition of any individually safe process
states which, when occurring concurrently,
create a separate hazard (for example, over-
load of emergency storage, multiple relief to
flare system)
Planned included as a check
point for HAZOP. Possible feed-
back to be documented in SRS.
Version 2
5 The assumed sources of demand and de-
mand rate on the safety instrumented func-
tion
The assumed source of de-
mand and demand rate are
based on OLF 070 i.e. assum-
ing low demand mode of oper-
ation. For functions not cov-
ered by OLF 070 further details
are found in system SRS.
Version 1
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ID Reference to IEC 61511, Chapter 10.3 Comments SRS version
6 Requirement for proof-test intervals As specified in COP document
TCD 5048/9/. A review of
test interval in order to opti-
mize could be performed in
compliance calculations indi-
cate compliance with SIL re-
quirements.
Version 1
7 Response time requirements for the SIS to
bring the process to a safe state
Information found in various
data sheets as well as design
philosophy documents. The
requirements are more detailed
in the system SRS. Documents
specifying fulfilment of re-
quirement is referred to in the
system SRS.
Version 2
8 The safety integrity level and mode of oper-
ation (demand/continuous) for each safety
instrumented function
Found in SIL allocation Report
and specified for each function
in the system SRS. The default
mode of operation is default
low demand if not otherwise
specified in system SRS.
Version 1
9 A description of SIS process measurements
and their trip points
Information found on P& ID,
SCD or data sheets. Relevant
information referred to in sys-
tem SRS.
Version 3
10 A description of SIS process output actions
and the criteria for successful operation,
for example, requirements for tight shut-off
valves
Information found in Cause &
Effect sheets, SCD, and ESD
Block Logic. Relevant informa-
tion referred to in system SRS.
Version 3
11 The functional relationship between pro-
cess input and outputs, including logic,
mathematical functions and any required
permissive
Information found in Cause &
Effect sheets, SCD, and ESD
Block Logic. Relevant infor-
mation referred to in system
SRS and illustrated with relia-
bility block diagram for func-
tion “typical” in system SRS.
Version 2
12 Requirements for manual shutdown Information found in general
design philosophy documents.
Will be referred to in SRS if rel-
evant.
Version 2
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ID Reference to IEC 61511, Chapter 10.3 Comments SRS version
13 Requirements relating to energise or de-
energise to trip
To be evaluated case by case.
Fail-safe principles to be evalu-
ated (e.g. deluge valve).
Version 2
14 Requirements for resetting the SIS after a
shutdown
Information found in opera-
tions manual. Specific require-
ments are identified in system
SRS.
Version 2
15 Maximum allowable spurious trip rate To be evaluated case by case.
Important with logging of
statistics during operations.
As a guideline parts of a SIF
should have a MTTFST > 5
years.
Version 2
16 Failure modes and desired response of the
SIS (for example, alarms, automatic shut-
down)
Information found in SAR and
Operation manuals
Version 2
17 Any specific requirements related to the
procedures for starting up and restarting the
SIS
Information found in opera-
tions manual. Will be referred
to in system SRS.
Version 2
18 All interfaces between the SIS and any other
system (including the control system and
operators)
To be considered in connection
with manual systems. Informa-
tion found in System Engineer-
ing Manual... Relevant system
interfaces are specified in sys-
tem SRS.
Version 2
19 A description of the modes of operation of
the plant and identification of the safety in-
strumented functions required to operate
within each mode
Information found in Opera-
tions manual. The identified
safety functions shall be de-
signed to function in all modes
of operation, unless otherwise
specified.
Version 3
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ID Reference to IEC 61511, Chapter 10.3 Comments SRS version
20 The application software requirements All software to be documented
in accordance with check lists
in IEC 61508 Part 3. It shall
also be documented as part of
the SAR to be issued by rele-
vant Suppliers. Documentation
of compliance to software re-
quirements to be referred to in
the final SIL compliance doc-
umentation (i.e. in the rele-
vant system SRS) to be issued
prior to end of detail engineer-
ing phase.
Version 2
21 Requirements for over-
rides/inhibits/bypasses including how
they will be cleared
Information found on P & ID
and SCD. As a general require-
ment the safety functions shall
not be bypassed unless risk re-
ducing measures that equal the
risk reduction by the SIF are im-
plemented.
Version 2
22 The specification of any action necessary to
achieve or maintain a safe state in the event
of fault(s) being detected in the SIS. Any
such action shall be determined taking ac-
count of all relevant human factors
Information found in test pro-
cedures and operations manu-
als and on SCD
Version 2
23 The mean time to repair which is feasible for
the SIS, taking into account the travel time,
location, spares holding, service contracts,
environmental constraints
Information found from main-
tenance program and spare
part program. However the
assumption as that in a by-
pass/override of a safety func-
tion for maintenance, com-
pensating measures are imple-
mented that equals the risk re-
duction performed by the SIF.
Version 3
24 Identification of dangerous combinations of
output states of the SIS that need to be
avoided
Included as a checkpoint for
HAZOP to be included in sys-
tem SRS if identified.
Version 2
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ID Reference to IEC 61511, Chapter 10.3 Comments SRS version
25 The extremes of all environmental condi-
tions that are likely to be encountered by
the SIS shall be identified. This may require
consideration of the following: temperature,
humidity, contaminants, grounding, elec-
tromagnetic interference/radio frequency
interference (EMI/RFI), shock/vibration,
electrostatic discharge, electrical area clas-
sification, flooding, lighting, and other
related factors
Information found in Design
basis and COP specifications.
To be referred to in system SRS.
Version 2
26 Identification to normal and abnormal
modes for both the plant as a whole (for ex-
ample, plant start-up) and individual plant
operational procedures (e.g. equipment
maintenance, sensor calibration and/or re-
pair). Additional safety instrumented func-
tions maybe required to support these
modes of operation
Information based on Design
basis and specifications
-
27 Definition of the requirements for any safety
instrumented function necessary to survive
a major accidental event, for example, time
required for a valve to remain operational in
the event of a fire
Information found in vulner-
ability considerations in con-
nections with the risk analysis
(QRA). Specific requirements
for survivability to be speci-
fied in system SRS. In general
all SIFs shall be designed ac-
cording to the design acciden-
tal loads.
Version 2
Appendix C
Detailed SAR Content
This is a description of detailed SAR content taken from ConocoPhillips (2013b). (See Cono-
coPhillips, 2013b, Chapter 4.2)
| Abbreviations List of all abbreviations used
|| References List of all relevant references with data, time, revision no., document no., docu-
ment owner etc.
||| Summary Shall include conclusion of whether the SIL requirements are met or not, sugges-
tions of potential improvements to achieve better performance vs. IEC61508 and IEC61511
1 Introduction Shall contain general information, presentation of the suppliers process work
with respect to "Management of functional safety" e.g. how the requirements have been
implemented in the package delivery.
2 System Description Shall contain a description of the component(s) which have SIL require-
ments and is delivered as part of the package. It may be sufficient to refer to the SRS or
other documents which covers the intent of this chapter, but the SRS will normally not
cover this chapter in sufficient detail.
3 System Topology and Block Diagram Shall contain a description of the arrangement of the
system vs. the other elements in the SIF and interfaces with other systems (in particular
with other electrical/electronic/programmable electronic systems). Shall also include a
description of how the components in the SIF are linked together.
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4 Operational Description of the System Shall contain a description of how the component(s)
shall be operated to fulfil the SIL requirements.
5 Assumptions Shall include a list of all essential assumptions made regarding the performance
of the component(s). Essential assumptions can be assumptions regarding operational
environment, maintenance, performance of other components in the SIF (e.g. ability to
discover dangerous failures by the automatic system), and analytical assumptions (i.e. re-
lated to calculations).
6 Failure Rate of the Components Shall contain the failure rate(s) of the component(s) covered
by the SAR. As a minimum, the failure rates shall be given as total failure rate and danger-
ous undetected failure rate for each component. This chapter shall also document how
the failure rates are found and the information shall be traceable. If generic failure data
are used there shall be documentation of why generic failure data can be used for the
supplied components (i.e. why the supplied components are as good as or better than,
the historic generic failure data). Generic failure databases that can be used are Offshore
Reliability Data (OREDA), Electronic Parts Reliability Data (EPRD), Non-electronic Parts
Reliability Data (NPRD), or similar high quality databases. Failure data can also be de-
veloped through FMECA (ref. IEC 61508-2, Annex C) or by in-house data (i.e. estimates
based on number of delivered components and reported number of failures. Note that for
in-house data to be approved it is required that the vendor has pro-actively gathered fail-
ure data from use. The classification of dangerous/safe detected/undetected failures may
be documented through use of e.g. FMECA. The applied reliability data shall be traceable.
The rate of spurious trips shall also be documented in this chapter.
7 Diagnostic Coverage and Safe Failure Fraction Shall contain calculations of SFF for each com-
ponent. Diagnostic coverage (DC) can also be calculated and documented. DC and SFF
are calculated as follows:
DC = λDD
λD
(C.1)
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SF F = λT OT AL −λDU
λT OT AL
(C.2)
Ref. IEC 61508-2, annex C and IEC 61508-6, annex C. λD = probability of dangerous fail-
ures λDD = probability of dangerous detected failures λDU = probability of dangerous un-
detected failures λS = probability of safe failures
λT OT AL =λDD +λDU +λS (C.3)
Note: No-effect and no-part failures shall not play any part in the calculations of the diag-
nostic coverage or the safe failure fraction, ref IEC 61508, annex C.
8 Architectural Constraints (HFT and Voting Principles) Shall document that the component(s)
comply with the requirements for HFT as given in tables 2 and 3 in IEC 61508-2, clause
7.4.4.2.2. The component must be classified into type A or B (see IEC 61508, clause 7.4.4.1.2
and 7.4.4.1.3), and by using the required SIL from the package specification and the cal-
culated SFF from chapter 7, verify that the component can operate with the suggested
HFT in the SIF (and its associated SIL) without increasing the HFT. The reasoning behind
classification into either type A or B shall be properly documented. This is particularly
important if a type A component is claimed.
9 Common Cause Failures Shall document the probability of common cause failures. This chap-
ter is only relevant for SIFs involving two or more components in parallel (i.e. where more
than one failure is required to result in critical failure in a SIF). The β-fraction model shall
be used unless otherwise agreed with Company. It is recommended that the methodol-
ogy suggested in IEC 61508-6, annex D is used for developing the β-fraction unless field
experience data is available.
10 Behaviour of System / Components on Detection of Fault Shall describe how the system or
component will behave on detection of a fault in the system/component. Ref. IEC 61508-
2, clause 7.4.8 and IEC 61511-1, clause 11.3.
11 Mean Time to Repair Shall describe the estimated average time spent for repair of the com-
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ponent(s). Only the active repair time is required to be given, as the administrative and
logistic delays as well as time for ramp up etc. cannot be properly estimated by the com-
ponent supplier.
12 Factory Testing Shall describe how Factory Acceptance Test (FAT) shall be performed and
documented. This chapter may refer to other documents.
13 Operational Testing Shall describe how testing shall be performed on the component(s) to
be able to achieve the failure rates and SFF described in the chapters 6 and 7. This chap-
ter shall give requirements related to operational testing to minimize the probability for
failures not discovered by the test (referred to as independent failure or probability for
systematic failures). A minimum recommended functional test interval can also be given
in this chapter if different from the required minimum test interval given by the package
specification. If the required PFD is not met for the component(s) covered by the SAR, this
chapter shall give the required minimum test interval to achieve the required PFD. If the
PFD is met with some margin, the suggested increased minimum test interval should be
given.
14 Avoidance and Control of Systematic Failures Shall describe how the component supplier
has ensured that systematic failures are minimized. As a minimum, the tables A.15-A.19
and B.2-B.6 in IEC 61508-2, annex A.3 and B shall be completed. If documentation of
proven in use is available, reference is made to chapter x section x (proven in use).
15 Software Documentation Shall describe how the component supplier has ensured that the
software development is performed within sufficiently controlled forms. As there are no
software safety requirement specifications made in the project, the minimum require-
ment is that the component supplier completes the tables A.2-A.10 and B.1-B.9 in IEC
61508-3, annex A and B. The response can be non-compliant vs. the requirements in the
standard, but it is expected that the component supplier can document what has been
done for each topic covered by these tables. In the vendor comments/method columns it
is expected that the software supplier gives a brief description of how the software supplier
has executed the relevant technique/measure in his software realization. It is required to
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have a response to all columns, but for “—” and “NR” this response can be short, e.g., “not
implemented”. If “HR” recommendations have not been implemented this can be accept-
able, provided the alternative method is equal or better than the recommended approach.
IF “NR” recommendations have been implemented, this can be acceptable, provided rea-
sonable argument for implementing this measure can be given and the same time assur-
ing that the performance of the software will not be negatively affected by implementing
this not recommended technique/measure.
16 Results This chapter shall give the main results from the report and indicate whether the SIL
requirement is complied with or not. If required, propose measures for fulfilling the SIL
requirements. A summary of the results documented in the SAR shall be in the following
format:
Table C.1: SAR Results
Component name:
Component identification (e.g. Tag no.)
Test interval Hours
Failure rate (10-6 / hour) (λT OT AL) Failures / hour
Dangerous undetected failure (λDU ) Failures / hour
Safe failure fraction (SFF) -
Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) Hours
Calculated PFD -
Common cause failure (CCF) (β-factor) %
Within Allocated PFD (Y/N)
Source
Assumptions
Comments
Appendices E.g. Certificates, test documentation, FMECA, Failure reports.
Appendix D
SAR Example for Non-Proven and Proven
Technology
This is an example of the SAR content for ASVs for the two cases in chapter 6. An E-ASV represent
non-proven technology and an H-ASV represent proven technology. The examples are based on
information found in ExproSoft (2013) and technical reports provided by ExproSoft AS.
| Abbreviations List of all abbreviations used:
ASV Annulus Safety Valve
E-ASV Electrically operated Annulus Safety Valve
H-ASV Hydraulically operated Annulus Safety Valve
etc.
|| References Document references:
No Document Date Rev Doc no Made by
1 Safety Requirement Specification
(SRS)
Operator
2 Safety Analysis Report require-
ments
Operator
3 Industry standards such as IEC
61508-2
2013 2 IEC
5 Product Description 2011 5 Vendor
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||| Summary The summary shall include:
• Conclusion of whether the valve meets the SIL requirements or not
• A copy of the result table in section 16
• Recommendations to achieve high performance
1 Introduction The introduction shall present the vendors work process with respect to man-
agement of functional safety. The following steps are typically included:
• How to achieve technology readiness
• How to achieve operational readiness
• How to collect and learn from experience data
2 System Description The system description shall include the following issues related to the
component:
• Intention
• Location
• What does it look like
• Installation and retrieval
• How it works
• Independence
• Configuration
• FMECA
• Closing time
3 System Topology and Block Diagram Shall describe the SIF by words and by illustration (a
reliability block diagram). The block diagram may be similar for both H-ASV and E-ASV
and may look like figure D.1.
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SolenoidESD Logic
ASV
AMV
Figure D.1: Example of a block diagram for both E-ASV and H-ASV
4 Operational Description of the System Shall describe how the component(s) shall be oper-
ated to fulfil the SIL requirements. It is normal to refer to operational procedure.
5 Assumptions This is normally provided as a list of all essential assumptions made regarding
the performance of the component(s). E.g. operational environment, maintenance and
analytical assumptions (i.e. related to calculations).
6 Failure Rate of the Components This section shall have the following sub sections:
• Data sources
• Dangerous undetected failure rate (λDU )
• Dangerous detected failure rate (λDD )
• Non-safety critical (safe) failure rate (λS)
• Total failure rate (λT OT )
• Probability of failure on demand (PFD)
Failure rates are typically based on failure data from field experience for the specific equip-
ment. When experience data are not available there are two options:
• Utilize generic data
• Use FMECA to develop failure rates
If generic data is used there shall be documentation of why generic failure data can be
used for the supplied component. If it is claimed that the component is better than or
as good as the generic data, this must also be documented. Only high quality databases
can be used as sources for the generic data. Failure data can also be developed through a
FMECA (ref IEC 61508-2, Annex C).
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The various failure rates are calculated using the formula (D.1):
λ= No.of failures
Aggregated time in service
= n
τ
(D.1)
λT OT is calculated using the formula (D.2):
λT OT =λDD +λDU +λS (D.2)
Note that dangerous detected failure rates are based on safety critical failure modes de-
tected by self testing or operating personnel. The failure rate λDD is not relevant for ASVs
since such equipment normally does not include automatic self testing equipment. The
failure rate λDD is thus set to 0.
The probability of failure on demand (PFD) shall be calculated for the component with
the test interval given in the SRS.
Also note that only failures related to the component itself shall be registered as compo-
nent failures. Cascading failures caused by e.g. a solenoid valve in the hydraulic system
causing a safety valve failure shall not be included in the data set.
7 Diagnostic Coverage and Safe Failure Fraction Diagnostic coverage (DC) is only required for
equipment with automatic self test or for failures detected by operating personnel. DC
will thus not be included for either of the ASV designs in this case.
The safe failure fraction (SFF) is calculated using formula (D.3).
SF F = λT OT −λDU
λT OT
(D.3)
For the ASV cases, SFF can be calculated as shown in formula D.4 since λDD = 0 and since
λT OT is calculated as shown in formula (D.2).
SF F = λS
λDU +λS
(D.4)
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8 Architectural Constraints (HFT and Voting Principles) The first step is to determine whether
the component is of A-type or B-type. The component is A-type if all possible failure
modes can be determined for the component. All safety valves without software are A-
type components. Since both ASV designs in this case are assumed without software and
thus low complexity both will be categorized as type A components.
The second step is to use OLF 070 guideline, table 8.2 to determine the maximum SIL
the component can be applied for, which is determined by the safe failure fraction (SFF)
calculated in section 7 and the hardware fault tolerance (HFT).
• HFT = 0 means that the subsystem is used as a stand-alone component
• HFT = 1 means that the subsystem is used together with 1 redundant component
• HFT = 2 means that the subsystem is used together with 2 redundant components
An ASV is HFT = 1 because it is redundant with the annulus master valve (AMV). Examples
from table 8.2 in OLF 070 with different SFF values:
• An ASV with SFF = 66% and HFT = 1 can be used for a SIL 3 system
• An ASV with SFF = 59% and HFT = 1 can be used for a SIL 2 system
• An ASV with SFF = 59% and HFT = 2 can be used for a SIL 3 system
9 Common Cause Failures In practice, this section is only relevant for systems with two or more
components in parallel. If the vendor is responsible for these two components in parallel,
the vendor shall also suggest a beta factor. If the vendor only is responsible for one of the
components in parallel, the vendor shall only discuss internal and external hazards that
may cause common cause failures (CCF). For ASVs, such hazards can e.g. be:
• Deposits
• Hydrate formation
10 Behaviour of System / Components on Detection of Fault This item is not applicable for ASVs
which are systems without software and failure detection systems. Reference is made to
IEC61511-1, clause 11.3. for systems which includes software and failure detection. This
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requirement is probably made to ensure that such systems covers at least 60% of its safe
failures.
11 Mean Time to Repair This chapter shall describe the average time spent on repair of the
component. Only the active repair time shall be provided, as administrative and logis-
tic delays as well as time for ramp up etc. cannot be properly estimated by the component
supplier. The repair time normally includes pull, replace and install. Longer repair time is
normal for components related to topside wells compared to subsea wells.
12 Factory Testing This chapter shall describe how FAT shall be performed and documented.
Only a short summary of the test procedure shall be included in the SAR. Reference shall
be made to FAT documents which shall be included in the reference list. A description of
how the test results are stored shall also be included.
13 Operational Testing This chapter shall describe how the operational testing is performed.
The following items shall be included:
• Initial testing
• Regular testing
• Recommended regular test interval
• Test interval described in the operator SRS
• Recommendations to avoid systematic failures
Systematic failures are failures that are undetected during the regular testing. Such failures
are assumed to be the same for both ASV designs and shall be documented in this chapter.
14 Avoidance and Control of Systematic Failures Shall describe how the component supplier
has ensured that systematic failures are minimized. As a minimum, the tables A.15-A.19
and B.2-B.6 in IEC 61508-2, annex A.3 and B shall be completed. There are reduced re-
quirements for documentation related to avoidance and control of systematic failures if
the component can be classified as either:
• Proven in use
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• Prior us
• Low complexity
If one of these items can be documented, the only additional requirement will be to doc-
ument a structured quality assurance (QA) system, preferably ISO 9000 certified. This can
be done by attaching a copy of QA certificates or a copy of the procedures. This will be the
practice for the ASV designs since both are considered low complexity and the H-ASV can
be certified as proven in use or prior use.
15 Software Documentation Shall describe how the component supplier has ensured that the
software development is performed within sufficiently controlled forms. There is nothing
to document for either ASV designs since there is no software included in these systems.
16 Results This chapter shall summarize the main results in a table. An example is provided in
table D.1 (example data) :
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Table D.1: SAR Results
Component name: H-ASV
Component identification -
Test interval 6 months
Failure rate (λT OT ) 2,0 per 106 hours
Dangerous undetected failure
(λDU )
0,5 failures per 106 hours
Safe failure fraction (SFF) 68%
Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) 144 hours
Calculated PFD, τ= 6 months 2,3 ·10−3
Common cause failure (β) NA
Within Allocated PFD (system) To be calculated by operator or contractor
Source Data is collected from OREDA
Assumptions See section 5
Comments NA
Appendices E.g. Certificates, test documentation, FMECA, Failure reports.
Appendix E
Fault Tree Analyses
This chapter includes fault trees with input data and minimal cut sets used in chapter 7.
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E.1 Input Data
Table E.1: List of input data (from reliability data in chapter 7 section 7.3) which is used in the
FTAs
Hazard Basic
event
name
Failure
rate
Mean time to re-
pair (MTTR)
Test interval (τ)
per 106
hour
days hours months hours
ASV internal leak ASVI 0,487 28 672 6 4380
ASV external leak ASVE 0,117 28 672 6 4380
ASV packer leak ASVP 0,374 28 672 6 4380
M-SAS internal leak MSASI 2,2 7 168 12 8760
M-SAS external leak MSASE 0,0778 7 168 12 8760
AAV external leak AAVE 0,117 28 672 NA NA
AAV internal leak AAVI 0,244 28 672 NA NA
Leak through tubing
hanger
TH 0,135 28 672 12 8760
Leak through WH con-
nector
WHC 0,0857 7 168 12 8760
AMV external leak AMVE 0,0778 1 24 12 8760
AMV internal leak AMVI 1,454 1 24 12 8760
Leak through pressure
monitoring
M 0,1 1 24 12 8760
Leak through blind
flange
BF 0,0973 1 24 12 8760
Leak through pipes P 0,300 1 24 NA NA
AWV external leak AWVE 0,0778 1 24 12 8760
AWV internal leak AWVI 1,454 1 24 12 8760
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E.2 FTA (Base Line)
This section includes fault trees for the base line.
CARA Fault Tree version 4.1 (c) Sydvest Sotfware 1999
Academic Licence for NTNU, Trondheim, Norway
Educational purposes only - not for commercial use
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Figure E.1: Fault tree analysis for option 1 ASV + AMV
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Figure E.2: Fault tree analysis for option 2 AMV
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Figure E.3: Fault tree analysis for option 3 ASV + AMV + M-SAS
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Figure E.4: Fault tree analysis for option 4 AMV + M-SAS
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E.3 Minimal Cut Sets (Base Line)
Table E.2: List of minimal cut set for option 1: ASV + AMV
Option: Cut set order Cut set
1 1 NA
Total amount: 0
1 2 ASVI,BF1
1 2 ASVI,M1
1 2 ASVI,AAVE
1 2 ASVI,AMVE
1 2 ASVE,BF1
1 2 ASVE,M1
1 2 ASVE,AAVE
1 2 ASVE,AMVE
1 2 ASVP,BF1
1 2 ASVP,M1
1 2 ASVP,AAVE
1 2 ASVP,AMVE
Total amount: 12
1 3 ASVI,TH,WHC
1 3 ASVI,AMVI,AWVE
1 3 ASVI,AMVI,P2
1 3 ASVI,AMVI,BF2
1 3 ASVI,AMVI,M2
1 3 ASVE,TH,WHC
1 3 ASVE,AMVI,AWVE
1 3 ASVE,AMVI,P2
1 3 ASVE,AMVI,BF2
1 3 ASVE,AMVI,M2
1 3 ASVP,TH,WHC
1 3 ASVP,AMVI,AWVE
1 3 ASVP,AMVI,P2
1 3 ASVP,AMVI,BF2
1 3 ASVP,AMVI,M2
Total amount: 15
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Table E.3: List of minimal cut set for option 2: AMV after ASV failure
Option: Cut set order Cut set
2 1 BF1
2 1 M1
2 1 AAVE
2 1 AMVE
Total amount: 4
2 2 TH,WHC
Total amount: 1
2 3 AMVI,MSASE,AWVE
2 3 AMVI,MSASE,P2
2 3 AMVI,MSASE,BF2
2 3 AMVI,MSASE,M2
Total amount: 4
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Table E.4: List of minimal cut set for option 3: ASV + AMV + M-SAS
Option: Cut set order Cut set
3 1 NA
Total amount: 0
3 2 ASVI,BF1
3 2 ASVI,M1
3 2 ASVI,AAVE
3 2 ASVE,BF1
3 2 ASVE,M1
3 2 ASVE,AAVE
3 2 ASVP,BF1
3 2 ASVP,M1
3 2 ASVP,AAVE
Total amount: 9
3 3 ASVI,TH,WHC
3 3 ASVI,MSASI,AMVE
3 3 ASVI,MSASI,MSASE
3 3 ASVE,TH,WHC
3 3 ASVE,MSASI,AMVE
3 3 ASVE,MSASI,MSASE
3 3 ASVP,TH,WHC
3 3 ASVP,MSASI,AMVE
3 3 ASVP,MSASI,MSASE
Total amount: 9
3 4 ASVI,MSASI,AMVI,AWVE
3 4 ASVI,MSASI,AMVI,P2
3 4 ASVI,MSASI,AMVI,BF2
3 4 ASVI,MSASI,AMVI,M2
3 4 ASVE,MSASI,AMVI,AWVE
3 4 ASVE,MSASI,AMVI,P2
3 4 ASVE,MSASI,AMVI,BF2
3 4 ASVE,MSASI,AMVI,M2
3 4 ASVP,MSASI,AMVI,AWVE
3 4 ASVP,MSASI,AMVI,P2
3 4 ASVP,MSASI,AMVI,BF2
3 4 ASVP,MSASI,AMVI,M2
Total amount: 12
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Table E.5: List of minimal cut set for option 4: AMV + M-SAS
Option: Cut set order Cut set
4 1 BF1
4 1 M1
4 1 AAVE
Total amount: 3
4 2 TH,WHC
4 2 MSASI,AMVE
4 2 MSASI,MSASE
Total amount: 3
4 3 MSASI,AMVI,AWVE
4 3 MSASI,AMVI,P2
4 3 MSASI,AMVI,BF2
4 3 MSASI,AMVI,M2
Total amount: 4
APPENDIX E. FAULT TREE ANALYSES 130
E.4 FTA (M-SAS as AAV)
This section includes fault trees when M-SAS valve is used as AAV.
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Figure E.5: Fault tree analysis for option 1 ASV + AMV using M-SAS valve as AAV
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Figure E.6: Fault tree analysis for option 2 AMV using M-SAS valve as AAV
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Figure E.7: Fault tree analysis for option 3 ASV + AMV + M-SAS using M-SAS valve as AAV
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Figure E.8: Fault tree analysis for option 4 AMV + M-SAS using M-SAS valve as AAV
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